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THESIS

**NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CONTROL
OF THE ARMED FORCES: THE EXPERIENCE OF
POLAND AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEIGHBORING
"PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" COUNTRIES.**

by

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March, 1998

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NEIGHBORING "PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE" COUNTRIES.**

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

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
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
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ABSTRACT

The collapse of the Warsaw Pact, the end of global confrontation and the subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union brought about a real opportunity for European unification and transatlantic security. Thus, there is a unique chance for the states of Central and Eastern Europe to build an improved security architecture in the whole Euro-Atlantic area after half a century of division. That is why Central and East European countries are seeking to join NATO and in that way provide increased stability, peace and security for all, without creating new dividing lines.

To join NATO all Central and East European countries need to accomplish democratic transformation especially in the system of civil-military relations. Democratic civilian control of the military is one of the main prerequisites for Central and East European states to qualify for inclusion in NATO. Thus, NATO enlargement can promote democratic transformations of the East European countries, especially in civil-military relation realm, and integration of the Central and East European countries into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. By admitting new members NATO will make itself better able to address Europe's new security challenges. Such a broad concept of security embracing political, economic and defense factors can be the basis for the new security architecture which must be built through a process of integration and cooperation among the partners.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Under European communist regimes, the military was completely subordinated to the Communist Party through a system of political commissars. The military was also subordinated to Moscow and the requirements of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow determined defense policy, military doctrine and even military strategy for the members of the Warsaw Pact. The disappearance of such geopolitical realities as the Warsaw Pact and the USSR has removed the old totalitarian pressure from half of the European continent. This development has enabled many nations to integrate with Euro-Atlantic institutions.

To integrate into Western institutions, especially NATO, all Central and East European countries must accomplish the democratic transformation of their civil-military relations because democratic civilian control of the military is one of the main requirements for Central European states to qualify for inclusion in NATO. This thesis argues therefore that civil-military relations can be seen as an indicator for the post-communist reforms in Central and East European countries. In addition, the degree of democratic civilian control over the armed forces forms a measure of the stability and durability of the state, the depth of democratization processes. This thesis analyzes how NATO enlargement has promoted democratic transformation in Central and East European countries, especially in the civil-military relations realm and, as a result, how the integration of Poland into the North Atlantic Treaty Organization has unfolded in the recent past.

In order to understand what changes must be made for civil-military relations to accomplish democratic transformation the author describes the system of military control,

the unique pattern of civil-military relations in the Warsaw Pact Countries and provides answers for the three important questions:

- 1. What has been the character of communist civil-military relations ? What has been their structure and functions?*
- 2. What is the framework of the democratic model of civilian control over the armed forces?*
- 3. What have post-communist countries done to replace old civil-military relations and to establish new democratic control over the military?*

The author argues that, in order to transform communist to democratic political systems, all post-communist countries must establish effective mechanisms of democratic civilian control over the armed forces and institutionalize democratic military professionalism. According to the author's view, having analyzed the Polish experience on the road to democracy, one can suggest patterns of process of democratic transformation from communist to democratic civil-military relations that are surely appropriate for Ukraine.

The process of self-identification of Ukraine has not been accomplished yet and still under way. The new Ukraine is not a part of the Soviet Union anymore. Its new borders, options, culture, and inner development made Ukraine another state that previously had not existed on the global political or geographical maps. New postsoviet Ukraine's renaissance has been already lasting for seven years after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. Seven years is a short period to mold national consciousness, shape political system, and perceive national development objectives and prospects. It is understandable that Ukraine's standing has much in common with the universal long-term interests of any nation:

- military security;
- political sovereignty; and
- sustainable economic development.

Obviously, the main effort ought to be focused on Ukraine's restoration and growth as a democratic country living in harmony with itself and the outside world. It should be the foundation for the national accord and unity of Ukrainian society and the creation of an open society that includes the triangle of market economy, a civil society, and a legally organized state. From the author's view, every nation has a unique historical experience, but the successful existence and peaceful development of NATO as a voluntary alliance of sixteen democratic states, the complete absence of military coups and arbitrary military rule in these countries throughout the history of NATO makes its experience universal for the other nations. In addition, history shows that democratic states very seldom go to war with another. That is why the experience of NATO in providing democratic civilian control over the military, acceleration of democratic reform, military integration and defense cooperation among the nations is extremely valuable for Ukraine as a new democracy.

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I. INTRODUCTION

A. THE NEW SECURITY ARCHITECTURE AFTER THE COLD-WAR: DILEMMA OF NATO ENLARGEMENT AND DEMOCRATIC CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

*"Study my brothers, think and read, learn from the others,
but don't forsake your own."*

T. Shevchenko¹

The end of the Cold War can best be dated to that moment on December 25, 1991 when the Soviet flag came down over the Kremlin for the last time. Thus "*began an era of change of historic proportions.*"² This thesis addresses aspects of this change as it concerns the soldier in the state in Central and Eastern Europe.

NATO today provides a new basis for stability, democratization and peace in Europe. This thesis analyzes the role of NATO enlargement in the promotion of democratic transformation in the Central and East European countries, especially in the sphere of civil-military relations. In particular, I examine the role of NATO enlargement in assisting democratization in Poland. Further, I assess the extent to which Poland met the political criteria for membership, especially in providing a new system of democratic control over the military.

Collective defense remains imperative for European security. The dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union eliminated the primary threat that NATO met

¹ John P. Connell, "Ukraine," *The DISAM Journal of International Security Assistance Management*, No. 1, Fall 1996, p.1.

² Richard Holbrooke "America, a European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 1995, no. 2 (March-April), p. 38.

during the Cold War. The division of Europe into spheres of influence made by the **Yalta Agreement** in 1945 does not exist anymore.³ However, military conflict in the former Yugoslavia, the Gulf War, recent acts of terrorism and clear dangers from the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, demonstrate that threats endure that endanger Euro-Atlantic security. In these circumstances the United States and its Atlantic partners can assist European integration and create greater security for themselves by engaging the **Central and East European countries** in the context of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation thereby increasing stability and diminishing threats to

² **Yalta Agreement.** *"A major executive agreement concluded during World War II at a summit conference of the Big Three (President Franklin Roosevelt, Prime Minister Winston Churchill, and Premier Joseph Stalin) held at Yalta in the Russian Crimea in February 1945 to develop joint strategy in the final stages of the war against Germany and Japan, and to resolve postwar political problems. The Yalta Agreement included a number of important decisions concerning war strategy and postwar policies, including those relating to the nature of the proposed United Nations organization. War-related decisions included in the Agreement were: (1) a guarantee that there would be free, democratic elections in the liberated countries of Eastern Europe implemented by coalition governments composed of communists and noncommunists; (2) a decision that Poland would be compensated for land lost to Russia by annexing all German territory up to the Oder and Neisse rivers, with the subsequent transfer of million of Germans out of the area; (3) an agreement that there would be an Allied occupation of defeated Germany, reparation would be exacted, war criminals would be brought swiftly to justice, and vigorous de-Nazification program would be carried out; (4) a commitment of Soviet entry into the war against Japan within three months of the end of the European war, in exchange for certain benefits, including Soviet annexation of the Kurile Islands and the southern part of Sakhalin Island, a recognition of Soviet hegemony over Mongolia, and a guarantee of railroad and port rights in China; and (5) a promise by Stalin to recognize Chiang Kai-shek as the sole spokesman for China by concluding a treaty of alliance with him. Major decisions concerning the proposed United Nations organization included (1) original membership in the new world organization would be open to all states that declared war against the Axis Powers by March 1, 1945; (2) the Soviet Union would receive three memberships, one each for the Soviet Union, the Ukraine, and Byelorussia; (3) the veto power in the Security Council would be limited to use on substantive but not procedural questions, and it could not be used by a party to a dispute to block Council consideration; and (4) a trusteeship system would be established to replace the League of Nations mandates system."* Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Plano, George Klein, "The Soviet and East European Political Dictionary," *ABC-Clio, Inc.*, 1984, pp. 343-344.

peace.⁴ This new security architecture is based on the idea that it is better to integrate rather than to divide Europe. Since 1991, NATO enlargement has already begun to:

- a.) foster democratic reforms and stability;
- b.) strengthen NATO's capacity for collective defense;
- c.) promote regional harmony and spread NATO's burdens more broadly;
- d.) help avoid a destabilizing zone of insecurity and turmoil in Europe;
- e.) create a better Central and East European climate for market growth and prosperity.⁵

To provide stability and security for post-Cold War Europe, Article X of the 1949 Washington Treaty states that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) shall admit new members that have adopted democratic criteria to provide greater civilian control over the military, expanded freedom for civil society and enacted other steps essential to the success of democracy in the region.⁶

⁴ **Central and East European countries.** *"Collective name for the former communist countries and their successor states, i.e. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia and Yugoslavia. It may also include the former Soviet republics, in particular Belorussia, Moldova and Ukraine."* Harry Drost, *What is what and who is who in Europe*, Simon & Schuster. 1995, p. 85.

⁵ Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.

⁶ In January 1994 at the NATO Summit in Brussels, allied leaders committed themselves to accept new members into the North Atlantic Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the 1949 Washington Treaty. The 1994 Brussels Declaration of NATO Heads of State and Government reaffirmed that the Alliance was open to membership of other European states in a position to further the principles of the Washington Treaty and to contribute to security in the North Atlantic Area. Chapter 1 of The NATO Enlargement Study (1995) clearly defined that one of the main aims of enlargement is to promote civilian and democratic control of the military: *"Enlargement will contribute to enhanced stability and security for all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area by ... encouraging and supporting democratic reforms, including civilian and democratic control over the military."* See *Study on NATO Enlargement* (Brussels: September 1995), NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/enl-9501.htm>

At the crucial NATO summit in Madrid on July 1997, NATO's sixteen heads of state and government invited three states from among the new democratic countries of Central and Eastern Europe (Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland) to start Alliance accession talks. The Secretary General of NATO, Dr. Javier Solana, said: *"The Madrid Summit has provided a comprehensive action plan for the future. It has given us a NATO where the commitment to wider European security and stability is no longer just a policy, but is now firmly reflected in the way we do business. The decisions taken at the Summit demonstrate that we are on course towards our goal: building a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe."*⁷

At the same time, all Central and East European countries must continue democratic transformation, especially in the pluralistic system of civil-military relations, to be eligible for NATO membership. Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, a researcher at the Hungarian Mission of the United Nations in New York, argues: *"In any country, the status of civil-military relations is inseparable from the democratic nature of the political and military elites. Civil-military relations can therefore be seen both as an indicator and the test for reform in Central Europe."*⁸ The degree of civilian control over the military forms an excellent measure of the *"durability and stability of the new political structures, the depth*

⁷ Javier Solana, "Building a new NATO for a new Europe," *NATO Review*, No. 4, Vol. 45, July-August 1997 - Summit Edition, p.3.

⁸ Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, "Central European Civil-Military Reforms At Risk", Adelphi Paper 306 IISS, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 5.

of the democratization process, and even the trend in political developments in the region."⁹

Furthermore, democratic control of defense is a common priority, for three main reasons:

First, it is an essential element of democracy. As Kant taught us, democracies are much less likely to go to war, especially against one another: therefore, democratic control of defense increases the likelihood that a country remains at peace, and thus improves its security, which is what defense forces are all about.

Second, far from tying its hands, democratic control of defense is useful for the military. The latter, just as other organizations, benefits from external scrutiny and oversight which catalyze improvement and help prevent abuse and waste; as demonstrated in many European countries and elsewhere in the world, a more transparent military is more efficient and effective than one which operates in social seclusion and above the law.

*Third, democratic control of defense provides the armed forces with indispensable legitimacy. In doing so, it earns them a greater degree of acceptance and respect by society at large, which they will need when seeking manpower (including conscripts) and national resources.*¹⁰

⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

¹⁰ Marco Carnovale, "NATO Partners and Allies: Civil-Military Relations and Democratic Control of the Armed Forces," *NATO Review*, No 2-March 1997, p. 32.

Therefore, in view of the above, *this thesis is based on the premise* that the political and social transformations in society affect civil-military relations. The communist political system has been characterized by communist civil-military relations, and a democratic political system is characterized by a variety of democratic civil-military relations. To change a political system from totalitarian to a democratic society we also must rebuild civil-military relations. We must be sure that the military plays a role according to the principles, norms and values of the democratic society. This issue has emerged with drama and force in Europe since 1989, as it has in earlier periods of upheaval and change.

In order to understand what changes should be made in civil-military relations to accomplish the democratic transformation of totalitarian communist regimes to democracy, this thesis describes the system of the military control and a unique pattern of civil-military relations that characterized the countries of Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) and provides answers for the three important questions:

- 1. What are communist civil-military relations? What are their structure and functions?*
- 2. What is the framework of the democratic model of civilian control over the armed forces?*
- 3. What should post-communist countries do to replace old civil-military relations and to establish new democratic control over the military?*

In order to become a NATO country, Poland has fostered democratic reforms and established a new system of civil-military relations to provide stability within society and effective democratic control of the armed forces according to the NATO's membership principles. Having analyzed the Polish experience on the road to democracy, this thesis seeks to uncover the process of democratic transformation from communist to democratic civil-military relations. It further seeks appropriate ways and models for other countries in the Partnership for Peace (PfP), particularly for Ukraine.

B. THE THESIS IN OVERVIEW

Chapter II outlines the principles and criteria of NATO enlargement and their influence on the promotion of democracy and reforms in civil-military relations. This chapter also describes the democratic structure of civilian control over the military.

Chapter III examines civil-military relations in the communist era. Furthermore it describes the system of military control and the unique patterns of civil-military relations in the Warsaw Pact Countries (WPC) as a whole and in Poland, especially.

Chapter IV offers an overview of the process of democratic transformation of civil-military relations in Poland including outstanding problems, difficulties and positive results.

Chapter V discusses the conclusions of the study and author's view of what Partner countries need to do to accomplish democratic transformation and provide democratic civilian control over the armed forces.

II. NATO ENLARGEMENT AND THE NECESSITY FOR DEMOCRATIC REFORM IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

A. INFLUENCE OF NATO ENLARGEMENT ON PROMOTION OF DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL AND EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

While long open to debate and criticism, the purpose of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is to safeguard the freedom and security of its democratic membership by political and military means. The alliance is based on the common values of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. *"The role played by the North Atlantic Alliance, from its establishment in 1949 to the end of the Cold War four decades later, was fundamental in bringing about the conditions which made these developments possible. As the instrument for guaranteeing the security, freedom and independence of its members, maintaining a strategic balance in Europe and promoting democratic values and the emergence of European democratic institutions, the Alliance created the stability which was the precondition for bringing an end to the adversarial relationship between East and West".*¹¹

Indeed, NATO was created to thwart the spread of totalitarianism westward from Moscow *"when the leaders of the West created the most successful peacetime collective security system in history, centered around the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, NATO, Atlantic partnership-and American leadership".*¹²

¹¹ *NATO Handbook* (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995), NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/hb00000e.htm>

¹² Richard Holbrooke "America, a European Power," *Foreign Affairs* 1995, no. 2 (March-April), p. 39.

After the Cold War the divisions of Europe never really disappeared. Europe is divided into three zones:

- the integrated and democratic West;
- the part of the former USSR reintegrating with Moscow;
- former Warsaw act members and former Yugoslavia.

NATO is the only security system to have survived and, for the time being, it stands alone as the guardian of stability in Europe. The newly liberated countries in Central Europe therefore have a vital interest in NATO's future policies and organization, and they should take an advantage of opportunities for diplomatic liaison that enable them to influence the Alliance's policies and deeds.

In these new political conditions, the fall of communism presented the alliance with the opportunity to weigh the costs and benefits of expanding toward its former enemies. Statesmen had to create a new political-military framework to provide stability and security in all of Europe. The new structure must unite NATO and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe. NATO is a defense alliance of democratic states connecting the Alliance with the Central and Eastern Europe countries. It would integrate these countries into the process of liberal democracy, economic prosperity, and military cooperation, thereby increasing stability and diminishing threats to peace.

This political process started in 1990, soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall.¹³

¹³**Berlin Wall.** "An action taken at the instigation of the General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Nikita Khrushchev, in August 1961 to fortify and seal off East Berlin from West Berlin. The building and military fortification of the Berlin wall were rapidly extended to the entire border between West Berlin and the surrounding East German territory, and to the entire East German-West German border. The building of the Berlin Wall and the border fortification between East and West aided the industrial expansion of East Germany by stopping the general exodus into West Germany. Because

In July 1990, thanks in part to President Bush, "NATO's London Summit Declaration set out new goals for the Alliance, called for changes in its strategy and military structure and declared that the alliance no longer considered Russia an adversary."¹⁴ The Allies declared:

In that spirit, and to reflect the changing political role of the Alliance, we today invite President Gorbachev on behalf of the Soviet Union, and representatives of the other Central and Eastern European countries to come to Brussels and address the North Atlantic Council. We today also invite the governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the Czech and Slovak Federal Republic, the Hungarian Republic, the Republic of Poland, the People's Republic of Bulgaria and Romania to come to NATO, not just to visit, but to establish regular diplomatic liaison with NATO. This will make it possible for us to share with them our thinking and deliberations in this historic period of change. Our Alliance will do its share to overcome the legacy of decades of suspicion. We are ready to intensify military contacts, including those of NATO Military

the building of the wall evoked only a verbal response from the West, the Soviets could assume that it amounted to a tacit agreement of the post-World War II division of Europe. The treaties later signed between East Germany and West Germany regularized policies on border crossing and millions of Germans could visit across the wall. The Berlin Wall itself remains for many a symbol of Soviet intransigence." Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Plano, George Klein, "The Soviet and East European Political Dictionary," ABC-CLIO, Inc., 1984, pp. 310-311.

¹⁴ Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.

*Commanders, with Moscow and other Central and Eastern European capitals.*¹⁵

Those efforts were reaffirmed by the Alliance's declaration in Copenhagen in June 1991, which stated that NATO's objective was *"to help create a Europe whole and free."*¹⁶

At NATO's Rome Summit in November 1991, the Alliance adopted a **New Strategic Concept**, which reaffirmed the continuing importance of collective defense while also orienting NATO toward new security challenges, such as out-of-area missions, crisis management and peacekeeping operations.

*In contrast with the predominant threat of the past, the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess. NATO must be capable of responding to such risks if stability in Europe and the security of Alliance members are to be preserved.*¹⁷

Manfred Wörner, the late NATO Secretary General and Chairman of the North Atlantic Council emphasized that the steps decided on by Heads of State and Government in London contained five important key elements:

¹⁵ *London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 5-6 July 1990), Articles 7 and 8. NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c900706a.htm>

¹⁶ Statement Issued by the North Atlantic Council Meeting in Ministerial Session, Copenhagen, 6-7 June 1991 in *NATO Communiqués 1991* (Brussels: NATO Office Information and Press, 1992), NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c910607a.htm>

¹⁷ *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991, Article 8, NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911108a.htm>

- *The establishment of a new relationship with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, once allied against NATO in the Warsaw Pact but now seeing in the Alliance a willing partner in their desire to draw closer to the West, and overcome a sense of isolation and insecurity;*
- *The elaboration of a new military strategy that would not only reflect the fact that NATO no longer faces a single overwhelming threat but which would also allow the Alliance to manage the more probable security challenges and crises it will face in the future;*
- *The determination to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and endow it with permanent institutions that would make CSCE more effective as a pan-European forum for cooperation and an instrument for managing crises and peacefully settling disputes;*
- *A commitment to pursue the arms control process beyond the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty with the aim of limiting the offensive potential of armed forces to the point at which surprise attack or major aggression would become impossible. A related aim would be to build trust and transparency with regard to the military activities of all CSCE states;*
- *The encouragement of a European security identity and defense role, reflected in the construction of a European pillar within the Alliance,*

*as a means of creating a more balanced and mature transatlantic partnership of equals.*¹⁸

At the same Summit, NATO created the **North Atlantic Cooperation Council** (NACC) to provide an institutional framework for political and security cooperation between NATO and the former communist states.¹⁹

Re'ka Szemerke'nyi argues: *"NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept was the first key document to promote active cooperation with Central and Eastern Europe. This document included two existing concepts of defense and dialogue and adopted a new one: cooperation with countries to NATO's east. The document also emphasized the role of shared democratic principles by East and West. As the establishment of democratic civil-military relations was one of these newly shared values, NATO began actively*

¹⁸ Manfred Wörner, "NATO Transformed: The Significance of the Rome Summit," *NATO Review* 1991 No. 6 (November-December), pp. 3-8.

¹⁹ **North Atlantic Cooperation Council** (NACC) intergovernmental organization. "An initiative of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the NACC-not to be confused with the North Atlantic Council (NAC), a NATO institution-was founded in December 1991 with the aim of building greater security in Europe and to provide a practical basis for 'dialogue, partnership and consultation' between NATO and the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The organization has 38 members, namely the 16 NATO countries, the former members of the Warsaw Pact in Eastern Europe, the 15 former Soviet republics, and Albania; Finland has observer status. NACC meetings, held at foreign-minister level, have focused on general security issues, arms control measures and means of resolving regional conflicts. Under the NACC's auspices NATO is also extending expertise to the former communist countries on such matters as training military personnel, creating the structures for democratic control of the armed forces, and converting arms industries to civilian use." Harry Drost, *What is what and who is who in Europe*, Simon & Schuster. 1995, p.85. "The creation of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 established a framework for dialogue and cooperation with the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and with the newly independent states which emerged from the former Soviet Union. The development of dialogue, partnership and cooperation with the Partner States builds on the principles established in NATO's Strategic Concept, adopted by Heads of State and Government in Rome in November 1991. NACC Activities Cooperation on defense-related issues, in military and peacekeeping fields, including exercises, was originally incorporated into the NACC Work Plan. This was then subsumed into Partnership for Peace activities." NATO Fact Sheet No. 1 NATO Online. Available <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs1.htm>

promoting it. This principle gradually became one of the fundamentals on which NATO's relations with Central Europe were based."²⁰ She emphasized: "The document specifically recommended developing practical ways of implementing civilian control of the military."²¹ The document stated:

We have consistently encouraged the development of democracy in the Soviet Union and the other countries of Central and Eastern Europe. We therefore applaud the commitment of these countries to political and economic reform following the rejection of totalitarian communist rule by their peoples. We salute the newly recovered independence of the Baltic States. We will support all steps in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe towards reform and will give practical assistance to help them succeed in this difficult transition. This is based on our conviction that our own security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. ²²

At its January 1994 Summit in Brussels, the Alliance made **three important initiatives.**

The first initiative launched the Partnership for Peace Program as a foundation for intensive cooperation among the armed forces of NATO members, all former Warsaw Pact countries, and other non-NATO European states that wanted to join this program.²³

²⁰ Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 64.

²¹ Ibid., p. 64.

²² *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, 8 November 1991, Article 9, NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c911108a.htm>

²³ Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S.

By providing the practical integration and cooperation of these very different forces, the PfP has led to the enlargement of NATO membership and supported integration into Europe. From the one side the PfP initiative indicated a willingness to offer the security guarantees and obligations of NATO membership to the former Warsaw Pact states, but from the other side many initiatives were undertaken within the PfP- program to promote democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's decision-making process also offered a good working example of democratic civilian control over the armed forces in sixteen nations.

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace... we will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be agreed.²⁴

To promote democratic civil-military relations NATO initiated several programs with special emphasis on civil-military relations, together with other organizations such as the North Atlantic Assembly, universities and independent research institutions. "They

Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.

²⁴ "Declaration of the Heads of State and Government issued by the North Atlantic Council in Brussels, Belgium," NATO Press Communiqué M-1(94)3, 11 January 1994, NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c940111a.htm>

organized seminars and workshops on such practical issues as democratic accountability and defense budgeting. Thus NATO began increasing its information activities to help establish and consolidate democratic civil-military relations in Central and Eastern European countries." ²⁵ Indeed, as soon as NATO decided to enlarge, the promotion of the candidates' civil-military relations gained even greater significance. The Alliance created several tracks to promote civil-military relations:

- Through the North Atlantic Cooperation Council numerous seminars and workshops were organized. Such issues as the conversion of defense industries and the necessity of democratic transformation of the armed forces were discussed.
- NATO invited to its schools and academies participants from the other countries.
- Many seminars and workshops for parliamentarians from Central and East Europe were organized by the North Atlantic Assembly to familiarize them with approaches to defense budgeting and military overseeing.
- Close military cooperation in peacekeeping operations were promoted through specific training and exercises.²⁶

At this time one can say that PfP has come a long way in a short time and has already shown concrete evidence of its potential. It is not just military cooperation, nor simply a framework for preparing Partner countries for future membership of the Alliance. Its objectives are much wider and more ambitious: a broader and deeper Euro-Atlantic relationship with all Partners. Begun as a series of exploratory partnerships between

²⁵ Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 66.

²⁶ Allen L. Keiswetter, "The Partnership for Peace and Civil-Military Relations in a Democracy" in Anton A. Bebler (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States. Central and East Europe in Transition*, Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997, p. 5.

NATO and non-NATO countries it has become a web of Partnership activities, which are increasingly responsive to the individual needs of Partner countries. The Partnership brings real benefits to NATO and to non-NATO countries, and to the security and stability of Europe as a whole. PfP promoted democratic approaches in defense policy-making within NATO itself *"by establishing working contacts among officers and soldiers of NATO member-states and Partner countries."*²⁷ The PfP objectives include almost all aspects of democratic civil-military relations:

- transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- enduring democratic control of armed forces;
- clear legal and constitutional frameworks;
- chain of command from the military to government through a civilian Minister of Defense;
- qualified civilians working with the military on defense policy, requirements and budget;
- a clear division of professional responsibility between civilian and military personnel;
- effective oversight and review by parliament.²⁸

Partnership for Peace became an instrument for building closer relationships with our new Partners to the East. Through PfP the East and the West seek to build the habits of consultation, trust and cooperation. Much of this cooperation is in the military sphere. At the same time PfP-countries build common ideas and approaches to peacekeeping and

²⁷ Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 67.

²⁸ Partnership for Peace: Framework Document, NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/pfp.htm>

*humanitarian support operations. There is, however, more to the Partnership for Peace than military exercises and activities. We aim to provide our experience and expertise to the new democracies in creating democratically organized and accountable Ministries of Defense. We also aim to introduce a planning and review process based on the force planning system that has played a major part in enhancing Alliance solidarity and underpinning the integrated military structure.*²⁹

The US State Department Program of **International Military Education and Training (IMET)** is another key component in the promotion of civil-military relations of post-communist countries. In new political conditions, this program gained even greater significance. IMET enjoys a legal mandate that permits it to perform a vital role in the professional education of civilian and military leaders of the PfP states. IMET exposes students to the US professional military establishment and the American way of life, including US regard for democratic values and respect for individual and human rights. Students are also exposed to the manner in which the US military functions under civilian control and how the military interacts with society. With this purpose IMET has expanded its role to promote democratic civil-military relations via military education programs. The specific objectives of these programs are:

1. To foster greater respect for and understanding of the principle of civilian control of the military;

²⁹ Willy Claes, "NATO and the Evolving Euro-Atlantic Security Architecture," *NATO Review*, No 1-January 1995, NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/articles/9501-1.htm>

2. To improve military justice systems and procedures in accordance with internationally recognized human rights;
3. To resolve the civil-military conflict that a country actually confronts, and bring together key military and civilian leaders in order to break down barriers that often exist between armed forces, civilian officials, and legislators of competing political parties
4. To modify existing civil-military mechanisms used by democracies to meet a country's own unique circumstances and help resolve civil-military conflicts.³⁰

George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies is also an important element of the US European Command (USEUCOM) in terms of the promotion of democratic civil-military relations via military education. *"Since its founding, the George C. Marshall Center in Garmisch-Partenkirchen has served as an important bridge between east and west."*³¹

In addition, the **Naval Postgraduate School** provides an opportunity for students from the post-communist countries to study in the **International Security and Civil-Military Relations Master's Degree Program**. This program provides the student with an analytical and practical understanding of how civilian officials, legislators, and military officers can work together to resolve security issues. The program meets the following related needs:

- a) the program gives civilian officials and military officers the skills to resolve security problems confronting their own democracies;

³⁰ The FY 1998 Security Assistance Budget Request by U.S. Department of State, *The DISAM Journal of International Assistance Management*, Vol. 19, No. 3, Spring 1997, p. 38-39.

³¹ John P. Connell, "Ukraine," *The DISAM Journal of International Assistance Management*, Vol. 19, No. 1, Fall 1996, p.12.

b) the program prepares its graduates to offer an in-depth understanding of democratic civil-military relations to others upon returning to their own countries and organizations, providing a multiplier effect for the initial investment in their education;

c) the program prepares students to help resolve civil-military issues raised by participation in U.N. peacekeeping operations, membership in the Partnership for Peace and other alliances, and security cooperation among the students' own nations and other nations, particularly the United States.³²

The second Alliance initiative launched in Brussels in 1994 was *"the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF). This concept enables NATO forces and military assets to be employed in a more flexible manner to deal with regional conflicts, crisis management and peacekeeping operations."*³³

The third important initiative of NATO embraced in Brussels in December 1994 was the opening of the Alliance to new membership.³⁴ NATO's leaders stated that according to Article X of the Washington Treaty, NATO *"remained open to membership for other European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to*

³² More information about the Civil-Military Relations Curriculum of the NSA Department of the Naval Postgraduate School may be obtained from The Center for Civil-Military Relations by Internet. Available HTTP: <http://www.pao.nps.navy.mil/ccmr.html>

³³ Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.

³⁴ According to Article X: *"The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession."* From *The North Atlantic Treaty Organization* (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 1997), NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/basicxt/treaty.htm>

contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area and that they expected and welcomed the new membership of democratic states to NATO's east.”³⁵

The Brussels' Communiqué stated:

Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe... We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.”³⁶

The Brussels' Communiqué confirmed that the main purpose of NATO enlargement is to provide stability and security for the whole of Europe. To reach these purposes several important political criteria emerged. *“The Clinton administration and its NATO allies, after some initial disagreement, have chosen a gradual and deliberate middle course and have begun the process. Several key points should be stressed:*

- First, the goal remains the defense of the alliance's vital interests and the promotion of European stability. NATO expansion must strengthen security in the entire region, including nations that are not members. The goal is to promote*

³⁵ Report to the Congress on the Enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization: Rationale, Benefits, Costs and Implications (Released by the Bureau of European and Canadian Affairs, U.S. Department of State, February 24, 1997), The U.S. Department of State Online. Available HTTP: http://www.state.gov/www/regions/eur/9702nato_report.html#executive. Available 3 March 1997.

³⁶ “Final Communiqué, North Atlantic Council, 1 December 1994,” Press Communiqué M-NAC-2 (94) 116, NATO Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/c941201a.htm>

security in central Europe by integrating countries that qualify into the stabilizing framework of NATO.

- *Second, NATO should no longer be considered an anti-Russian alliance.*
- *Third, there is no timetable or list of nations that will be invited to join NATO. The answers to the critical question of who and when will emerge after completion of this phase of the process.*
- *Fourth, each nation will be considered individually, not as part of some grouping.*
- *Fifth, the decision as to who joins NATO and when will be made exclusively by the alliance. No outside nation will exercise a veto.*
- *Sixth, although criteria for membership have not been determined, certain fundamental precepts reflected in the original Washington treaty remain as valid as they were in 1949: new members must be democratic, have market economies, be committed to responsible security policies, and be able to contribute to the alliance.”³⁷*

As President Clinton has stated: *“Countries with repressive political systems, countries with designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply”³⁸*

³⁷ Richard Holbrook, pp. 45-46.

³⁸ Ibid, p.46.

- *Last, it should be remembered that each new NATO member constitutes for the United States the most solemn of all commitments: bilateral defense treaty that extends the US security umbrella to a new nation. This requires ratification by two-thirds of the US Senate, a point that advocates of immediate expansion often overlook*".³⁹

This careful and gradual approach of the western leaders toward NATO enlargement can be explained by three potential weaknesses among the new members:

First, the alliance may admit states that might revert to a totalitarian regime.

Second, the alliance may admit states that as yet have an imperfect democratic political control of the armed forces.

Third, new NATO members may have militaries with an insufficient level of democratic military professionalism so that collaboration in an integrated command structure will be problematic.⁴⁰

That is why civil-military relations, effective democratic control of the armed forces, gained a new significance in the West and must be considered as a fundamental requirements of NATO and, as a result, the main criteria of the NATO's membership for the potential candidates. From my view, one of the most effective frameworks of democratic civilian control over the military was offered by the U.S. analyst Jeffrey Simon in four points:

³⁹ Ibid, p. 46.

⁴⁰ Marybeth P. Ulrich, "Democracy and Russian Military Professionalism," *Airpower Journal*, Special Edition 1996, p. 80.

- *A clear division of authority between the president and government (prime minister and defense minister) in Constitutions, Amendments, or through Public Law. The Law should clearly establish who commands and controls the military and promotes senior military officers in peacetime, who holds emergency powers in crisis, and who has authority for the transition to war.*
- *Parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the defense budget. Its role in deploying armed forces in emergency and war must be clear.*
- *Peacetime government control of general staffs and military commanders through civilian defense ministries. Control should include preparation of the defense budget, access to intelligence, involvement in strategic planning, force structure development, arms acquisitions and deployments, and military promotions.*
- *Restoration of military prestige, trustworthiness and accountability for the armed forces to be effective. Having come from the communist period when the military was often used as an instrument of external or internal oppression, society must perceive the military as being under effective national control. Military training levels and equipment must also be sufficient to protect the state.⁴¹*

⁴¹ For more information see Jeffrey Simon, "NATO Enlargement," National Defense University, INSS, *Strategic Forum*, No. 31(May 1995), p. 2.

The U.S. policy in "*The 1994 National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*" was also a vital document outlining the new significance of civil-military relations. On the criteria for candidate countries to join, the Strategy mentions '*democracy, prosperity and security cooperation*' among Partner countries.⁴²

B. WESTERN CONCEPTS OF DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF ARMED FORCES

The notion of democratic control is widely understood as meaning that armed forces are clearly subordinate and accountable to democratically elected authorities and that they do not constitute an autonomous entity capable of exercising excessive influence over policy. Chris Donnelly, NATO's special adviser for Central and East European Affairs, offers clarification to such an important notion as *democratic control*. According to him: "*Democratic control encompasses government direction of military activity and parliamentary oversight of both government and the military* (the English word "control" is often inadequately translated in this respect)."⁴³

At the same time, no single formula or model exists for democratic control. Alliance countries share a broad range of approaches that do not respond to a single set of criteria. A number of elements can be identified as being important for the achievement of democratic control. Rudolf Joo, Hungarian policy maker and scholar, argues: "*In Western countries there is no single solution to the problem of democratic control of the military:*

⁴² See "*A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*" (Washington DC: The White House, 1994) pp. 21-23, and Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 68.

⁴³ Chris Donnelly, "Defense Transformation in the New Democracies: a Framework for Tacking the Problem," *NATO Review*, January 1997, p.17.

the legal and political arrangements vary widely. Civil-military relations therefore differ from country to country: the role of the military in France is not like that in Belgium, the Spanish military is not the same as the Danish military, etc."⁴⁴ For example, a clear constitutional and legal framework, a civilianized Ministry of Defense, and effective parliamentary oversight are essential elements of democratic control of the military. However, for each element there is inevitably a qualification and differences of detail when applied to Alliance members. The absence of a single model means that assessing the adequacy of democratic control is troublesome. At the same time, while there are many political institutions and societal conditions that are similar or identical in most Western democracies, and that support the shared principle of civilian direction of the army, several essential requirements (societal, procedural and institutional) constitute the democratic model of civilian control of the armed forces.

They are:

- *the existence of a clear legal and constitutional framework, defining the basic relationship between the state and armed forces. On the one hand, this provides an important prerequisite of the functioning of the rule of law; on the other, it reduces the risks of uncertain jurisdictional claims, which can give rise to tension among separate parts of the political authority as well as between the political and military establishments;*

⁴⁴ Rudolf Joo, "The democratic control of armed forces. The experience of Hungary," *Chaillot Paper* No. 23; Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-February 1996, p.7.

- *the significant role of parliament in legislating on defense and security matters, in influencing the formulation of national strategy, in contributing transparency to decisions concerning defense and security policy, in giving budget approval and in controlling spending using 'the power of the purse' in issues related to 'the power of the sword';*
- *the hierarchical responsibility of the military to the government through a civilian organ of public administration - a ministry or department of defense - that is charged, as a general rule, with the direction/supervision of its activity. In most of the liberal democracies the central organization of defense is headed by an elected civilian politician, who is assisted by a number of qualified civilians (civil servants, political appointees, advisers etc.), who work together with military officers in carrying out strategic planning and coordination tasks;*
- *the presence of a well trained and experienced professional military corps that is respected and funded by a civilian authority. It acknowledges the principle of civilian control, including the principle of political neutrality and non-partisanship of the armed forces;*
- *the civilian and uniformed defense authorities divide their responsibilities in such a way that political authority and*

accountability on the one hand, and military professionalism and expertise on the other, are maximized;

- *the existence of a developed civil society, with a long-standing practice and tradition of democratic institutions and values that is able to resolve societal conflicts in an effective and efficient manner, and, as a part of the political culture, a nationwide consensus on the role and mission of the military;*⁴⁵

The priority for Central European policy-makers in the initial stage of reform for NATO membership was to establish the democratic institutions of civilian control. Their policies were driven by Western ideas and models from the very beginning of the transition process. Central European policy-makers studied various Western institutions; however, ambiguous information about the numerous different approaches can confuse even experienced researchers. From my view, the pillars of the western system, first and foremost, of the United States model of democratic civilian control of the armed forces rely on two main principles: *democratic political control* and *democratic military professionalism*.

These principles have to be considered not only to understand the democratic model of civil-military relations as a whole, but also as an excellent example of the unique framework and approach. The United States distinguishes itself by a successful

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 7.

development over two centuries-marked by an absence military coups and arbitrary military rule throughout. This record forms the best evidences of such effective policy.

Democratic political control includes certain criteria that govern civil-military relations. These parameters were summarized by Louis Smith and David F. Trask, leading scholars of American civil-military relations.

They include:

1. Civilian leadership of the executive branch of government.

*The national leadership is accountable to a popular majority through frequent and regular elections. Also, the chief executive may be removed by the exercise of well-established constitutional processes. For example, the Congress of the United States may discharge presidents from office, if they commit "high crimes and misdemeanors".*⁴⁶

2. Civilian leadership of the professional military services and departments.

*The professional military heads of the army, the navy and the air force are subordinate to civilian departmental heads. The chief executive appoints them, and the national legislature confirms them. In other words, the civilian stands at the head of the military chain of command, supported by civilian subordinates who oversee the day-to-day activities of the armed forces.*⁴⁷

⁴⁶ David F. Trask, "Democracy and Defense. Civilian Control of the Military in the United States," United States Information Agency, April 1993, p.3.

⁴⁷ Ibid., p.3.

Most important for the democratic civilian control of the military is Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution of the United States: the president is the Commander in Chief of the armed forces. This dual role is quite important for the civilian control. Thus, as a chief executive and commander in chief the president heads both the executive branch of government and the military services with the powers that include appointment of officers of the armed forces. Through his command authority, he provides for civilian control over the making of military policy.

Consequently, clear legal and constitutional provisions that define the basic relationship between the state and the armed forces are absolutely necessary for democratic society. This element of civilian control not only guards against military coups and arbitrary military rule but it also recognizes the military is a servant of national political goals established by the civilian government.

3. Statutory provisions to establish fundamental national security policies.

*Elected legislative representatives of the people enact laws that define the defense organization and policies of the nation.*⁴⁸

According to the Constitution of the United States, the congress passes legislation that defines the scope of military activity and provides basic guidelines. The president, as a chief executive, enforces legislative directives.

4. Judicial defense of civilian control.

⁴⁸ Ibid., p. 5.

*The judiciary prevents the military from compromising civil liberties, including those of members of the armed services. In the United States, the Supreme Court is empowered to hear cases that involve military infringements on the right of the citizenry.*⁴⁹

5. Separation of powers.

*The division of the responsibilities of the central government among the executive, legislative and judicial branches.*⁵⁰

This structural device directly affects civil-military relations. For example, despite the predominant role of the executive branch of government in civilian control, the legislative branch has an effective influence in military affairs, reflecting the principle of separation of powers. According to Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution of the United States *"The congress shall have power to...provide for the common Defense...of the United States."*⁵¹

The most important among the powers are: *"To declare War," "To raise and support Armies to that Use shall be for a longer term than two Years," and "To provide and maintain a Navy."*⁵² Consequently, the legislative branch has significant power in defense and security matters, including control over the budget.

6. Checks and balances.

⁴⁹ Ibid., p. 5.

⁵⁰ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 10.

⁵² Ibid., p. 10.

*The allocation of power among the different branches of the government of the government such that each is protected against the others-and the people against all-by requiring the approval by one branch of certain decisions made by the others.*⁵³

In addition, democratic political control is enhanced when the military is given a stable, legitimate, institutionalized status within the state.⁵⁴

In other words, the democratic state has to assign to the military a credible and honorable role in the defense of the state and of the accomplishment of national goals where appropriate. Furthermore, the state must prevent civilian politicians and militaries from misusing the military's monopoly of force to attain political goals. Consequently, the military professional must remain politically neutral, non-partisan and depoliticized.

As Rudolf Joo emphasized: "*Being neutral and non-partisan, the military officer can serve several successive governments. He serves the state, and the duly constituted (elected or appointed) state authority, and not just one segment of the political establishment. In this respect, his position is very similar to that of civil servants in a pluralistic regime.*"⁵⁵

The ideal of **democratic military professionalism** was described by the prominent political scientist Samuel P. Huntington. He has argued that a modern professional military can be characterized by:

⁵³ Ibid., p. 9.

⁵⁴ Constantine P. Danopolous and Daniel Zirker, "*Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States*," (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1996), p. xiv.

⁵⁵ Joo, p. 21.

- a) its experience in the management of the state's instrument of violence;
- b) a sense of corporateness and responsibility to society among its members;
- c) a "realistic" and "conservative" military ethic.⁵⁶

Historian David F. Trask mentioned that military professionalism emerged during the last years of the 19th century. From that time until now the United States military became professionalized. This development had two outcomes:

First, the military constitutes a profession whose membership is determined on the basis of achievement. In the United States military officers constitute neither a class nor a caste. Mandatory retirement further undermines any basis for the development of class or caste identifications.

Second, institutions founded to provide training and education to the officer corps, such as the military academies, the command and staff colleges, and the senior war colleges, seek to inculcate the value of professionalism in those they train. Professionalism requires of each officer a commitment to professional excellence-the observance of the highest technical standards in meeting the requirements of his or her chosen field. This generally excludes concern with political, economic or

⁵⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, New York, NY: Vintage Books, 1964., pp. 8-18 and pp. 59-79. The summary of the notions "realistic" and "conservative" is on page 79. For more information see also Russel F. Weigley, "Towards an American Army. Military Thought from Washington to Marshall," *Columbia University Press*, 1962, pp. 1-78.

civil matters that fall outside the narrow purview of the military profession. ⁵⁷

Hence, according to Trask's definition, democratic military professionalism includes the commitment to civilian control of the armed forces. From the view of this author, effective professionalism for external defense is the cardinal expectation which each society must have of its armed forces.

C. CONCLUSIONS:

1. To promote democracy in central and eastern Europe, the North Atlantic Alliance created several important criteria for states that desire to join NATO. New members must:

- a) be democratic;
- b) have market economies;
- c) be committed to responsible security policies;
- d) be able to contribute to the alliance.

Countries with repressive political systems, countries with territorial designs on their neighbors, countries with militaries unchecked by civilian control or with closed economic systems need not apply.

2. Partnership for Peace became an instrument for building closer relationships with Partners to the East. On the one hand, the Partnership for Peace initiative indicated a willingness to offer the security guarantees and obligations of NATO membership to the former Warsaw Pact. On the other hand, however, many initiatives were undertaken

⁵⁷ Trask, pp. 27-29.

within the PfP program to promote civil-military relations in Central and Eastern Europe. The PfP encourages democratic standards in defense policy-making within NATO itself by establishing working contacts among officers and soldiers of NATO member-states and Partner countries. Prominent among the objectives of PfP are practically all aspects of democratic civil-military relations:

- a) facilitating transparency in the national defense planning and budgeting processes;
- b) establishing enduring democratic control of armed forces;
- c) clear legal and Constitutional frameworks;
- d) chain of command from the military to government through a civilian Minister of Defense;
- e) qualified civilians working with the military on defense policy;
- f) requirements and budget;
- g) a clear division of professional responsibility between civilian and military personnel;
- h) effective oversight and scrutiny by parliament.

3. Western support for establishing democratic civilian control of the military is gaining strategic importance because of the Communist Party's long-standing influence over the military.

4. There is no single solution to the problem of democratic control of the military: the legal and political arrangements vary widely. Civil-military relations therefore differ from country to country and within NATO as a whole. This fact is indeed a source of strength.

5. Despite the absence of the single solution to solve such important problem as democratic control of the armed forces, there are at least two important political conceptions that serve as a pillars for the frameworks of the democratic control of the military in the western democratic societies.

They are:

- 1. Democratic political control by means of a separation of powers.**
- 2. Democratic military professionalism that embraces adequate means and sober ends.**

III. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER A SOVIET COMMUNIST REGIME: POINT OF DEPARTURE

A. THE NATURE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS UNDER COMMUNIST REGIMES

Under communism, the armed forces of the Communist states of Europe were under the control not only of their own communist parties but also of the communist party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and the High Command of the Warsaw Pact Organization. Soviet influence over Eastern Europe began with the Soviet liberation of territories during World War II. By 1948 communist regimes had come to power in all the East European states. Soviet military power played a decisive role in the creation of the communist states in Eastern Europe. A former Polish Communist leader, Wladyslaw Gomulka, underlined that the transformation of Polish society started without revolution because of the presence of the Red Army.⁵⁸ The Soviet Union exercised control over the East European states through political, economic and military mechanisms. Thus, to understand the nature of civil-military relations in the East European states one has to take into account the domination of civil-military relations by the Soviet-communist political system in general, because the structure and functions of the Party and the Governments in the East European states were very similar to those in the Soviet Union.⁵⁹

⁵⁸ Speech of Dec. 7, 1945, in A. Ross Johnson, *The Transformation of Communist Ideology: The Yugoslav Case, 1945-1953* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1972), p. 14.

⁵⁹ Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry outline four distinct stages in the evolution of Poland's civil-military relations under the influence of Soviet military-political system. They are: 1) co-optation of the Polish military into the communist party structures; 2) political subordination of the armed forces to the communist party; 3) accommodation between Polish military and communist party; 4) participation in managing of the country. See Andrzej Korbonski and Sarah M. Terry, "The Military as a Political Actor

Under communist regimes, all society's institutions including the armed forces were dominated by one political authority. This entity had no legitimacy in the eyes of the majority of the public. *"The leading organs of the Party-the Political Bureau and the Central Committee-were not democratically elected...The whole political environment in the Communist countries lacked transparency, political responsibility and accountability. The notion of constitutional checks and balances was altogether missing from these regimes."* ⁶⁰

Consequently, the Communist Party's control over the armed forces was not truly democratic because its institutions lacked the basic requirements of democratic control and accountability. Furthermore, the armed forces of communist countries were highly politicized because they, like the police and counterintelligence, were instruments of communist party's political power. As pillars of the regime, *"the military was not only part of the system, but also it become one of the guardians of the system, both on the domestic (national) and international (Warsaw Pact) level."* ⁶¹. That is why the maintenance of military loyalty through the party's control and supervision of the armed forces was the major policy goal under a communist regime. Thus, Communist Party control represented something quite different from a genuine democratic control in the

in Poland," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, eds., *Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats: Civil-Military Relations in Communist and Modernizing Societies* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1982), p. 160.

⁶⁰ Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The Experience of Hungary," *Chaillot Paper* No 23; Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-February 1996, p. 12.

⁶¹ Rudolf Joo, p. 13.

Western democracies.⁶² One should recall that democratic structures of civil-military relations in the countries with stable political systems and open civil society assume the following important criteria:

First of all, the existence of a constitution or basic law clearly defining:

- *the relationship between president, government, parliament, and the military;*
- *the checks and balances applying to this relationship, including the role of the judiciary;*
- *who commands the military;*
- *who promotes military personnel;*
- *who holds emergency powers in a crisis;*
- *where the authority lies for the transition from peace to war.*

Second, there should be political oversight of the military. This should be done in two ways: by means of democratic political control over the General Staff through the defense ministry-which includes a civilian component-and which itself is subject to parliamentary control, especially concerning the defense budget.

*Third, the military should maintain adequate levels of training and equipment order to safeguard the independence and territorial integrity of the state, but also to prevent demoralization and Bonapartism within the army.”*⁶³

⁶² Chris Donnelly, “Military-Civil Relations in Post-Communist Systems: Common Problems,” in K. Skogan (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in the post-Communist states in Eastern and Central Europe*, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993, pp.7-8.

The one-party system is monopolistic and hierarchical. At first sight, its structure seems to be relatively simple, but in reality, there are no clear divisions between different political institutions. Hence, it is difficult to understand and differentiate the interests of the varying political groups and their leaders involved in the decision-making process. This reality is one of the reasons why it is difficult to define Communist party leadership as a genuine civilian control.⁶⁴ Instead of genuine civilian leadership, the armed forces and their leaders were completely controlled by the *Nomenklatura system* of communist parties.⁶⁵ In such conditions, "it was a really big problem to identify where the Army responsibility ended, and where the Communist Party authority began." ⁶⁶

⁶³ Willem V. Eekellen, "The Security Dimensions of European Integration and the Central-East European States" in Anton A. Bebler (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States*. Central and Eastern Europe in Transition, (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), p. 9.

⁶⁴ Rudolf Joo, p. 13.

⁶⁵ **Nomenklatura system** "was developed in the Soviet Union and spread to all communist regimes. This system was a tool which the Party used to control appointments to senior position within all structures of Soviet society. This means that ...at every level of government, a list of key posts (called the *Nomenklatura*) and a list of people approved by the Party for holding office at a given level of responsibility are drawn up. This group of approved personnel is called the 'cadres' The Party committee at each level must approve the nomination of any new incumbent and regularly confirm the retention in office of the current holder. The more important the job, the higher the level of Party organization that controls the *Nomenklatura* and list of cadres. For example, the appointment of the editor of a local paper will be the responsibility of the local town or regional Party committee. The appointment of the editor of Pravda was made by the Politburo. Within the USSR's Ministry of Defense the post of Head of Cadres is a key position. The incumbent is responsible for maintaining the military list of cadres for appointment, with Party approval, to key army posts at all levels. In other words, no matter how good someone is at his or her professional job-as administrator, army officer or whatever-he or she will not be considered for appointment without the party's endorsement as well, that is, unless he or she is prepared to follow the approved Party line and accept Party guidance on all matters of significance. The system results in the erosion or destruction of institutional loyalty and independence, and ensures more effective and complete Communist Party control." Christopher Donnelly, "Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War," Coulsdon, Surrey: Janes's Information Group, 1988, pp. 99-100.

⁶⁶ Rudolf Joo, p. 15.

B. MAIN DIRECTIONS OF THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S LEADERSHIP OF THE DEFENSE OF THE COMMUNIST STATES

Communist Party leadership over the armed forces was undemocratic but no less real, and in most cases it was quite effective.⁶⁷ The Party developed and defined *military doctrine, policy* and *strategy*.

The leadership of the Communist Party is expressed first and foremost in the Party's formulation of the state **military policy** on the basis of which the people and army act to ensure the country's security. Military policy defined the political aims of the state, evaluated the international environment and the military potentials of probable adversaries, and established guidelines for Communist military involvement in the world. It both overlapped with and supported foreign policy of Communist's countries. Military policy took into account the economic, social, scientific, and specifically military capabilities of the Communist state and was used by the party to determine the optimal directions for structuring the armed forces and for strengthening the economic-technical base of the state's defense. Concerned about the integrity and security of the state, the party could modify its military policy as the interests of the state changed.⁶⁸

Soviet military policy was a political basis for Soviet military doctrine and depended on the following factors:

⁶⁷ Rudolf Joo, p. 15.

⁶⁸ In the former Soviet Union, *Soviet military policy* was an element of Party's policy, and the Communist Party directed military policy like all other elements of Soviet policy. Soviet military policy included the planning and manufacture of arms, the training of military personnel, military research, various mobilization measures, the formation of defensive alliances, the diplomatic practice, etc. All are determined by that policy. For more information see William T. Lee, "Soviet Perceptions of the Threat and Soviet Military Capabilities" in *Foundations of Force Planning. Concepts and Issues*, Naval War College Press, Newport, R.I., 1986., pp 142-143.

- a) *the economic potential-the level of economic development and of science and technology;*
- b) *the social potential-the relative strength of the combatant's socio-political structures;*
- c) *the moral-political potential-the ideological and moral spirit of the national populations;*
- d) *the military and combat potential-the relative fighting power of the opponents.*"⁶⁹

Military doctrine was the party line on military affairs. It defined the potential adversaries, the nature of future wars, the force requirements, the general direction of military development, the preparation of the country for war, and even the type of weapons needed to fight a war.⁷⁰ The party's military policy defined the political aims of the Communist state and proposed concrete measures to develop and strengthen the state's military might by improving the organization and the armaments of the armed forces.⁷¹

Marshal Grechko, former Minister of Defense of the Soviet Union, emphasized that military doctrine, at least, answers the questions:

- 1) What enemy will have to be faced in a possible war ?

⁶⁹ Christopher Donnelly, "Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War," *Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group*, 1988, pp. 104-105.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 105.

⁷¹ **Military doctrine** (Voennaya Doktrina) "A nation's officially accepted system of scientifically founded views on the nature of modern wars and the use of armed forces in them, and also on the requirements arising from this view regarding the country and its armed forces being made ready for war. **Military doctrine** has two aspects: **political** and **military-technical**. The basis tenets of a military doctrine are determined by a nation's political and military leadership according to the socio-political order, the country's level of economic, scientific and technological development, and the armed force's combat material, with due regard to the conclusions of military science and the views of the probable enemy." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 37.

- 2) What is the character of the war in which the state and its armed forces will have to take part; what goals and missions might they be faced with in this war?
- 3) What armed forces are needed to execute the assigned missions, and in what direction must military development be carried out?
- 4) How are preparations for war to be implemented?
- 5) What methods must be used to wage war?⁷²

In the West, the "military doctrine" embraces tactical principles or operational art and regulations. It usually amounts to a set of guidelines for the tactical commander. It may also contain a list of principles to act as a basis for decisions and to stimulate original and creative thought. In the United States, military doctrine is a flexible word. There are doctrines for the U.S. Armed Forces: Army doctrine and Air Force doctrine, for instance.⁷³ In contrast, "*in the former Soviet Union, there was only one military doctrine: the official Soviet military doctrine.*"⁷⁴ Soviet military doctrine was a close equivalent, in terms of content, to the national security policy in the United States. Soviet military doctrine was the policy of the Party-State worked out by the political leadership. It described the nature of future war, the methods for waging it, and the preparations and organization not only for different branches of the armed forces, but also for the entire armed forces and the nation as a whole. To clarify this thought one should underline that Soviet military doctrine was drawn up with the participation of key political, party and military leaders and officially approved by the Central Committee of the Communist

⁷² See John J. Dziak, "The Institutional Foundations of Soviet Military Doctrine" in Graham D. Vernon ed., *Soviet Perceptions of War and Peace*, National Defense University Press, 1981, p. 6.

⁷³ Joseph D. Douglass, "Soviet Military Strategy in Europe", *Pergamon Press*, 1980, p. 8.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

Party.⁷⁵ Only after official approval did it become an official political-military document and was used in preparing the country for war.⁷⁶

Military doctrine had *military-political* and *military-technical* components. Marxist-Leninist teaching shaped the *military-political* component of doctrine, which defined the party's overriding military-political goals and was by far the more important of the two components. Raymond L. Garthoff, a retired Foreign Service officer and a former Ambassador, argues that western commentators often mistake the political level as "*a concept they do not use, as being merely declamatory doctrine, or propaganda, or even disinformation. But the political level of Soviet military doctrine is not merely pronouncements, much less merely propaganda, any more than Soviet political and ideological doctrine is propaganda without policy relevance. Authoritative Soviet accounts describe the socio-political level of military doctrine as determining the military-technical one*".⁷⁷

Indeed, Soviet theorists claimed that the military-political component is more decisive in the formulation of military doctrine. The political-military component is shaped by political and economic strategies of the Communist Party, and to some extent, by the perception of global trends.⁷⁸ To clarify this thought one might cite as an example a

⁷⁵ Ibid., pp. 8-9.

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 9, and also Harriet F. Scott, "The Making of Soviet Military Doctrine" (Paper prepared for CFIA-PSIA-RRR Seminar at Harvard University, March 13, 1978).

⁷⁷ Raymond L. Garthoff, "New Thinking in Soviet Military Doctrine," *The Washington Quarterly*, Summer 1988, p. 132.

⁷⁸ "Military Doctrine," *Voyennyi entsiklopedicheski slovar'* (The Military Encyclopedic Dictionary, Moscow: Voenizdat, 1983; 2d ed., 1986), p.240. Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, the former Chief of General Staff of the USSR's armed forces, then editor of the first edition.

definition of military-political component of Soviet military doctrine made by former Commandant of the Soviet Academy of the General Staff Army General S. Ivanov. He said: *"The political principles include the propositions revealing the sociopolitical essence of war which the imperialists can unleash upon the Soviet Union, the character of the political objectives and the strategic tasks of the state in it, and their influence on the construction of the armed forces and the method of preparing for and waging war."*⁷⁹

The **military-technical** component of the military doctrine was affected by lead times and refinements in weapon systems, as well as a broad reading of the view of the probable enemy. It deals with the methods of waging war, the organization of the armed forces, their technical equipment and their combat readiness.⁸⁰

To clarify the distinction between Soviet military policy and Soviet military doctrine, one must underscore that Soviet military policy was much broader than merely doctrine. Whereas doctrine contained the guiding principles on the essence of future wars and on the methods and weapons for fighting them, Soviet military policy guided the development and strengthening of the state's military might through improving the

⁷⁹ Army General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy", *Voyennaya mysl*, No. 5, May 1969, FPD 0117/69, 18 December 1969 in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber (eds.), *Selected Readings from Military Thought; 1963-1973.*, *Studies in Communist Affairs*, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1982, Vol. 5, Part II. p. 24.

⁸⁰ Army General S. Ivanov said: *"The military-technical principles of the doctrine encompass questions of organization, training, and employment of the armed forces in war, determine the major trends for the combat employment, the technical equipping, and the organizational structure of the of the armed forces; the development of the military art, and the requirements for the combat training of troops and their combat readiness. This aspect of military doctrine is much more dynamic when compared with its political aspect."* Army General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Voyennaya mysl*, No. 5, May 1969, FPD 0117/69, 18 December 1969 in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber (eds.), *Selected Readings from Military Thought; 1963-1973.*, *Studies in Communist Affairs*, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1982, Vol. 5, Part II. p. 24.

organization and armaments of the armed forces so that they could be used successfully to achieve the state's political goals. Thus, Soviet military doctrine was based on Soviet military policy.⁸¹

To understand why the military-political component was more decisive in the formulation of Soviet military doctrine one should take into account the ideological nature of civil-military relations under communism "*Soviet military doctrine is a class doctrine. It expresses the interests of our people, who are building a communist society, and is directed at the defense of the socialist homeland from imperialist aggression. Together with this in it are expressed the international obligations of the Soviet nation and its armed forces.*"⁸²

Soviet military strategy was subordinated to doctrine. The military doctrine of the Soviet Union was the overall policy in principle. Using military doctrine as a starting point, Soviet military strategists amplified and investigated concrete problems regarding the nature of future war, the methods of warfare, and the organization and preparation of the armed forces for war.⁸³

⁸¹ Major General S. Kozlov, a prominent Soviet officer, underlined: "*present-day military doctrine is the political policy of party...an expression of state military policy, a directive of political strategy*". See *The Officer's Handbook* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1971), trans., U.S. Air Force (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 63.

⁸² Army General S. Ivanov, pp. 24-25.

⁸³ **Military strategy** (Strategiya voyennaya) "*The highest level in the field of military art, constituting a system of scientific knowledge concerning the phenomena and laws of armed conflict. On the basis of the tenets of military doctrine, the experience of past wars, and analysis of the political, economic and military conditions of the current situation, military strategy investigates and elaborates on problems pertaining to the training of the armed forces as a whole and the individual Services, and their strategic use in war; the forms and methods of conducting and directing war; and also problems pertaining to comprehensive strategic support of the combat operations of the armed forces. At the same time, military strategy is a field of practical activity for the higher military command and training of the armed forces for war and providing leadership in armed conflict. Military strategy exerts an influence on the*

Soviet military strategy was also closely linked to Soviet military policy. Policy defined the objectives of war and focused the attention of strategy on the tasks to be performed. Strategy's dependence on policy increased with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the use of which was controlled by the political leadership. Under communism even military strategy reflected the high degree of politicization of the Soviet armed forces. This phenomenon can be explained by ideological nature of Soviet military thinking. Historically, Soviet military thought was based on the Clausewitzian-Leninist dictum that politics drives all and that war is an extension of politics. Lenin mentioned that *"all wars are inseparable from the political systems which engender them."*⁸⁴ Lenin took Clausewitz's political-military conceptions and adapted them to Communist Party military policy. Prominent Soviet Marshal V.D. Sokolovski restated this theme.⁸⁵ He said: *"The acceptance of war as a tool of politics determines the relation of military strategy to politics;...the subordination of military strategy to state policy determines not only the nature of strategic aims, but also the general nature of strategy. For instance, the policy*

preparation of a country for war in such a way as to ensure victory." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 215.

⁸⁴ Lenin's comments and notes can be found in Donald E. Davis and Walter S. G. Kohn, "Lenin's Notebook on Clausewitz," in David R. Jones, ed., *Soviet Armed Forces Review Annual*, Vol. 1 (Gulf Breeze, Florida: Academic International Press, 1977), pp. 188-299.

⁸⁵ **Sokolovski, Vasilii Danilovich** (7.21.1897-5.10.1968) *"Born at Kozliki, near Grodno. Son of a peasant. Joined the Red Army, 1918. Took part in the Civil War as a regimental commander, brigade commander, and divisional chief-of-staff. Graduated from the Military Academy of the Red Army, 1921. Deputy Chief of the General Staff, Feb. 1941. During World War II, gained prominence as Commander of the Western front, 1943-44, and Deputy Commander of the 1st Belorussian front, Apr. 1945. Commander of Soviet Forces in Germany, 1946-49, and 1st Deputy Minister of Defense, 1949. Chief of General Staff, 1952-60. Member of the Central Committee of the CPSU, 1952-61, and candidate in a member of the Politburo of the CPSU. Died in Moscow. Buried at the Kremlin wall."* *A Biographical Dictionary of the Soviet Union 1917-1988*, by Jeanne Vronskaya with Vladimir Chuglev, Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd Chippenham Wiltshire, 1989, p. 410.

*of imperialism, an outmoded social structure, consists of desire to forestall its inevitable downfall and to prevent the rational development of the world toward socialism ."*⁸⁶

Finally one can conclude that the origins of Soviet military doctrine and Soviet military strategy relied upon the policy of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the theoretical heritage of Marxism-Leninism. Army General S. Ivanov underlined: *"The sources, the ideological and methodological basis of Soviet military doctrine and strategy, are there: Marxist-Leninist teaching on war and the army; Leninist principles on the defense of the socialist homeland which serve as a basis of CPSU and Soviet government policy in the resolution of all tasks of military organization; economic, moral, and scientific-technical capabilities of the state; data of military science and materialist dialectics which scientifically substantiate the character of war and preparation for waging it successfully in a specifically military respect."*⁸⁷

C. SOVIET CONTROL OVER THE WARSAW PACT COUNTRIES

Soviet military power in Eastern Europe was a principal instrument of Soviet policy after World War II. It was the ultimate guarantor of East European policies and political regimes acceptable to the USSR. This generalization can be confirmed by some historical events. In Hungary, anti-Soviet riots broke out in October 1956 and escalated

⁸⁶ From *Military Strategy: Soviet Doctrine and Concepts*, edited by Marshal V.D. Sokolovsky, Chapter 1: "General Concepts," in Colonel Arthur F. Lykke, Jr. USA, Retired, ed., *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, United States Army War College, 1989, pp. 410-411.

⁸⁷ Army General S. Ivanov, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Strategy," *Voyennaya mysl*, No. 5, May 1969, FPD 0117/69, 18 December 1969 in Joseph D. Douglass, Jr. and Amoretta M. Hoeber ed., *Selected Readings from Military Thought: 1963-1973.*, *Studies in Communist Affairs*, Government Printing Office, Washington DC, 1982, Vol. 5, Part II. p. 18.

immediately to full-scale revolt, with the Hungarians calling for full independence, the disbanding of the communist party, and withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact.⁸⁸ The Soviet Union invaded Hungary on November 4, 1956, and Hungarian prime minister Imre Nagy was arrested and later executed. The events of the 1950s taught the Soviet Union a lesson that Soviet military power and occupation forces were the main guarantees of the continued existence of East European communism. Czechoslovakia's 1968 liberalization, or "Prague Spring," led to a Warsaw Pact invasion in August 1968, illustrating that even gradual reforms were intolerable at that time to the Soviet Union.⁸⁹ The invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 was in effect an act of war in which all the members of the Pact, except Romania, took part.

The so-called **Brezhnev doctrine** was subsequently invoked in an attempt to legitimize this unprovoked aggression, claiming that *"the sovereignty of individual socialist countries cannot be counterpoised to the interests of world socialism."*⁹⁰ After invasion of the Warsaw Pact armed forces in Czechoslovakia in 1968 Leonid Brezhnev, former General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, told the Czechoslovak leaders: *"Your country is the region occupied by Soviet soldiers in World War II. We paid for this with great sacrifices and we will never leave. Your borders are our borders. You do not follow our suggestions, and we feel threatened...we are*

⁸⁸ See Hannah Arendt, "Reflections on the Hungarian Revolution," *Journal of Politics* 20.1 (February 1958); Paul Kecskemeti, *The Unexpected Revolution: Social Forces in the Hungarian Uprising* (Stanford, CA, 1961); Miklos Molnar, *Budapest, 1956: A History of the Hungarian Revolution* (London, 1971); *United Nations Report of the Special Committee on the Problem of Hungary* (New York, 1957).

⁸⁹ See Jiri Valenta, "Soviet Policy toward Hungary and Czechoslovakia," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, Yale University Press, 1984, pp. 95-105.

⁹⁰ See *Pravda*, 25 September 1968.

completely justified in sending our soldiers to your country in order to be secure within our borders. It is a secondary matter whether or not there is an immediate threat from anyone; this is an issue of principle, which will hold, [as it has] since World War II, forever."⁹¹ After the August 1968 Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia, which ended a process of liberalization begun by the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union made clear the irreversibility of communism in Eastern Europe.⁹² The invasion in Czechoslovakia considerably affected the multilateral and bilateral relationships within the Warsaw bloc. The Soviet Union demonstrated its ability to mobilize its allies to use

⁹¹ A. Ross Johnson, "The Warsaw Pact: Soviet Military Policy in Eastern Europe," in Sarah Meiklejohn Terry, *Soviet Policy in Eastern Europe*, Yale University Press, 1984., p. 256.

Brezhnev Doctrine "A doctrine developed by Leonid Brezhnev and the Soviet leadership that declares that the Soviet Union and Eastern European socialist states are committed to defend, by force of arms if necessary, the integrity of the socialist system whenever and wherever it is threatened. The Brezhnev Doctrine was developed and invoked in 1968 as an after-the-fact rationale to justify the Soviet-led invasion and occupation of Czechoslovakia by troops of the Warsaw Treaty Organization. Like the Monroe Doctrine, the Brezhnev Doctrine was a policy expounded by a major state that seeks to maintain a degree of hegemony within its regional sphere of influence. Leonid Brezhnev presented it as part of the doctrine of "social internationalism", which enunciates the principles of solidarity and unity among socialist nations. For Brezhnev, all socialist states have responsibility to protect and preserve socialism, by force of arms if necessary. The Brezhnev Doctrine clearly limited the sovereignty of East European states. It was a continuation of the Soviet policy carried on since the end of World War II that held that the Soviet Union must unilaterally determine what policies and actions are politically acceptable in bloc states. Brezhnev justified this view by holding that countries like Czechoslovakia can maintain their sovereignty only under conditions of socialism. Thus, Soviet intervention in a socialist state was a domestic rather than a foreign matter, and Western criticism of violations of sovereignty was rejected outright. The Brezhnev Doctrine emphasized the priorities of the Soviet leadership. In 1979, the Doctrine was given new meaning with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the application of the principle of "socialist solidarity" to a non-bloc country. The potential threat of intervention that characterized the Brezhnev Doctrine was apparent in Poland during the early 1980s when many observers feared that the Soviets would intervene militarily to suppress the independent trade union Solidarity." Barbara P. McCrea, Jack C. Plano, George Klein, "The Soviet and East European Political Dictionary," *ABC-Clio, Inc.*, 1984, pp. 311-312.

⁹² For more information about the invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Warsaw Pact see: Gordon H. Skilling, *Czechoslovakia's Interrupted Revolution* (Princeton, NJ., 1976).; Eduard J. Czerwinski and Jaroslav Piekalkiewicz, eds. *The Soviet Invasion of Czechoslovakia: Its Effects on Eastern Europe* (New York, 1972); Ivan Svitak, *The Czech Experiment, 1968-1969* (New York, 1971); Jiri Valenta, *Soviet Intervention in Czechoslovakia, 1968: Anatomy of a Decision* (Baltimore, MD, 1979); Pavel Tigrit, *Why Dubcek Fell* (London, 1971).

military force and to impose obedience on a deviant client-state.⁹³ In the military field, Soviet aims had been to ensure the controlled development of the East European national armies. To reach this political aim the armed forces of the East European countries had to be modified and integrated to conform with the Soviet model with respect to:

- *doctrine-all armies had to conform in general to Soviet organizational models and Soviet tactical and operational practices;*
- *equipment-both the means of production of weapons and equipment and the major items of equipment had to be standardized on Soviet lines;*
- *the role each national army would play in any concerted Pact action.*⁹⁴

Adherence to these principles made it possible for the Soviet Union to use the military industrial complex and the armed forces of the East European countries and also to integrate their forces very easily with the Soviet armed forces in case of WTO joint military exercises. In order to ensure the conformity of Warsaw Pact and Soviet practices, officers of WTO countries were required to attend the Soviet military institutes, academies and General Staff Academy Courses. This requirement gave to the Soviet side a good opportunity not only to assess the command style but also to make sure of the competence and reliability of their allies.⁹⁵

⁹³ Soviet theorist Colonel Timorin argued that socialists armies exist not only to defend socialism against its external enemies, but against its internal enemy as well. He stressed: "*The internal function of a socialist army has three aspects: 1) as a psychological deterrent against anti-socialist forces; 2) as a backup for internal security forces; 3) as a combat force in those cases when the opposition of the enemies of socialism within a country acquires significant scale, intensity, duration and sharpness (a counterrevolutionary uprising, mutiny, banditry, the unleashing of civil war).*" Christopher Jones, "Soviet Military Doctrine and Warsaw Pact Exercises," in Derek Leenaert, ed., *Soviet Military Thinking*, London. George Allen & Unwin. 1981, p. 229.

⁹⁴ Christopher Donnelly, "Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War," *Coulsdon, Surrey: Jane's Information Group*, 1988, p. 239.

⁹⁵ *Ibid*, p. 239.

D. PILLARS OF THE COMMUNIST'S PARTY CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

As Rudolf Joo argues, *"Recent history of the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, and of the former Soviet Union, indicates that the Communist parties never fully trusted the professional military."*⁹⁶

In order to prevent military coups in Communist regimes and maintain unconditional loyalty of the military to the Party, several important steps were taken. The Party had three mechanisms of control over the country's armed forces:

First, the top military leaders were systematically integrated into the highest echelons of the Political Bureau, Communist Party Central Committee and subjected to party discipline.

Second, the Communist party placed a network of political officers throughout the armed forces to influence the activities of the military.

Third, the special departments, under the direction of the Communist party, maintained a network of officers and informers in the armed forces.⁹⁷

In the former Soviet Ministry of Defense, the high ranking generals were regularly elected as members or candidate members to the CPSU's **Central Committee**.⁹⁸ Central

⁹⁶ Rudolf Joo, p. 15.

⁹⁷ Rudolf Joo, p. 16.

⁹⁸ **Central Committee (of the CPSU)** "A political 'general staff' of the Politburo. It was comprised of over 300 voting and candidate members. Its work was effected through about twenty-four varied departments which provided the staff work for the Politburo and control of the state apparatus, including the military. Next to the Politburo, the Central Committee was the principal formulator of Communist Party political strategy, including foreign policy."

Politburo "The apex of decision-making in the USSR. It was comprised of about twenty-two members (14 voting, 8 candidates). "Elected" by the Party's Central Committee, the Politburo was the highest policy-making body for all Party and State matters, including defense affairs. It established and guided the political strategy of the Party and was the final authority on military doctrine." John J. Dziak, *Soviet*

Committee membership came with certain important posts and major field commands. Military officers with full membership on the Central Committee generally included the minister of defense, the first deputy ministers of defense, the deputy ministers of defense and the chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy. Candidate members of the Central Committee included the commanders of military districts and fleets. The commanders of military districts and fleets were usually members of Central and Regional Party Committees of the Soviet republics in which the district or fleet was located.⁹⁹

One of the most important channels of Party influence was the *Main Political Directorate* (or the Main Political Department, as it was called in some countries). Originally, the commissar or political officer system was developed by Trotsky's revolutionary Red Army in 1918-19, to ensure the loyalty of the large numbers of former Tsarist officers in the new Red Army during the Civil War in Russia (1917-1922).¹⁰⁰

Perceptions of Military Power: The Interaction of Theory and Practice, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc. New York., 1981. pp. 69 and 72.

⁹⁹ By virtue of their position and membership in the Communist Party "senior military officers sat as members of these Central, Regional and District Party Committees. On one hand, CRSU could control the military through the Committees but on the other hand the military has a real voice in local government, and local Party officials have: (a) a responsibility to help and support the military in their area; (b) the ability to supervise and monitor local military activity and the state of affairs in the local garrisons, and; (c) an immediate formal link by which the military can be involved in matters of local security or in even of national emergency. This contact also allows senior Party and military officials to make the personal contacts and forge links of personal friendship and respect which mean so much to the smooth running of any society but which are crucial to the Soviet system." Christopher Donnelly, "Military Involvement in Government" in *Red Banner: the Soviet Military System in Peace and War*, Coulsdon, Surrey: Janes's Information Group, 1988, pp. 95-96.

¹⁰⁰ Rudolf Joo, p. 17, and R. Craig Nation, *Black Earth, Red Star. A History of Soviet Security Policy* (London: Ithaca, 1992), pp. 18-19. For more information see also Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, *The Armed Forces of the USSR* (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979), pp. 257-258.

Immediately after the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, Vladimir I. Lenin, leader of the communists, decreed the establishment of the Workers' and Peasants' Red Army on January 28, 1918, and Leon Trotsky was then first Commissar for War.¹⁰¹ The communists recognized the importance of building an army under their control; without a loyal army, the Communist Party itself would have been unable to hold the power it had seized. The Main Political Directorate (MPD) *"was the principal instrument used by the Central Committee of the CPSU to maintain political control over the armed forces, including rigid adherence to the Communist Party policies and directives."*¹⁰² It organized, conducted, and reported on political and ideological indoctrination in the armed forces, supervised the military press, and monitored the ideological content of

¹⁰¹ **Trotskii, Lev Davidovich (Bronstein; Trotsky, Leon.)** 11.7. 1879-8. 20. 1940. "Revolutionary, politician. Born at Ianovka near Elizavetgrad (Kirovograd) in Ukraine. Son of an estate manager. Educated at Odessa High School. Early involvement in revolutionary activity. Arrested and exiled to Siberia, 1898. Became a member of the Social-Democratic Party of Russia. Worked with Lenin on Iskra. After the split of the Social-Democratic Party of Russia, 1903, joined the anti-Lenin Menshevik fraction. Officially joined the Bolsheviks in Aug. 1917. Member of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party. Main organizer and practical leader of the October Revolution in 1917. Created the Red Army and achieved victory in the Civil War in Russia by his extremely effective actions: his use of unprecedented terror (special Cheka detachments, often Latvian, Chinese, or from revolutionary groups of prisoners of war, especially Hungarian), and his use of professional military cadres from the Imperial Army drafted to the Red Army, their complete loyalty insured by a double hostage system—firstly by a communist political commissar attached as a supervisor to every military commander and secondly by the hostage situation of the members of the officers' families. Brilliant orator, he overshadowed Lenin and completely overwhelmed Stalin, whom he in any case treated with open contempt, calling him 'the most outstanding mediocrity.' Proposed schemes of mass compulsion (labor armies and collectivization) which were successfully denounced by Stalin as extremist (and later realized by him in a modified form). Removed from his post as Commissar of War, 1925, and from Politburo, 1926. Expelled from the party with his followers, 1927, exiled to Alma-Ata, 1928, and banished from the USSR, 1929. Lived in exile in Turkey, 1929-33, and in France, 1933-35. After a short stay in Norway, moved to Mexico, 1936. Wrote on the Russian revolution and on Stalinism, and tried to organize the 4th International as a pure revolutionary movement, not corrupted by Stalinist bureaucracy. Killed by Mercador, a Spanish agent of Stalin, in his study in Coyoacan by an ice-pick blow to the skull." *A Biographical Dictionary of the Soviet Union 1917-1988*, by Jeanne Vronskaya with Vladimir Chuglev, Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe LTD Chippenham Wiltshire, 1989, p. 446.

¹⁰² "Handbook of the Soviet Armed Forces", DDB-2680-40-78, Defense Intelligence Agency, February 1978, pp. 2-6.

military publications. The Central Committee *"appointed MPD leaders to serve on the Bureau, the executive body of the Main Political Directorate, which was responsible for the overall implementation of Party policy in the armed forces, basing its activity on Central Committee directives."*¹⁰³ *"As was the case with many other Soviet institutions, the MPD was copied almost in detail and introduced by the people's armies established at the end of the 1940s"* in all the Warsaw Pact Countries.¹⁰⁴

The Main Political Directorate was subordinate to the Ministry of Defense, as well as to the Communist party Central Committee. It had the official status of a Central Committee department and reported to the Central Committee outside the military chain of command. These reports included information on the political attitudes and reliability of armed forces personnel and high-ranking officers in particular. The Main Political Directorate supervised a network of political organizations and officers within the armed forces. Every armed service, territorial command, and supporting service had a **Political directorate** (Politicheskiye upraleniya).¹⁰⁵ Service branches, divisions, and military education institutions had **Political departments** (Politicheskiye otdely) which were

¹⁰³ "Handbook of the Soviet Armed Forces", DDB-2680-40-78, Defense Intelligence Agency, February 1978, pp. 2-6.

¹⁰⁴ Rudolf Joo, p. 17.

¹⁰⁵ **Political directorate** (Politicheskiye upraleniya) and **Political departments** (Politicheskiye otdely) *"The leading Party organs of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in the armed forces of the USSR in the field of Party-political work. It is an obligation of political departments to devote all their work to strengthening the combat might of the Soviet Army and Navy, ensuring the daily and undivided influence of the Communist Party on the entire life and activity of the Armed Forces, and the solidarity of personnel around the CPSU and the Soviet government. Political departments are created in the army and in the fleet by the Ministry of Defense and the Main Political Directorate in accordance with the structure established by the Central Committee of the CPSU."* Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View) (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.

smaller than directorates. Each political department had a small staff that included a chief, a deputy chief, several senior political instructors, and officers responsible for agitation and propaganda, party organizational work and **komsomol organizations** (All-Union Leninist League of Communist Youth).¹⁰⁶ A party commission of high-ranking personnel was attached to each political directorate and department. A deputy commander for political affairs was assigned to each unit of company, battery, and squadron size or larger.¹⁰⁷ A deputy political commander (zampolit) served as a political commissar of the armed forces. Zampolits were representatives of Communist party in uniform. A zampolit supervised party organizations and conducted **party political work** within a military unit.¹⁰⁸ The main form of party-political work, in terms of ideological influence, in peace

¹⁰⁶ **Komsomol organizations in the Soviet Army and Navy** (Komsomol'skiye organizatsii v Sovetskoy Armii i Voenno-Morskoy Flote) "Komsomol organizations, uniting members of All-Union Leninist League of Communist Youth in units, installations, in military educational institutions, and in establishments; they are active helpers of the organizations of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union by putting into practice the policies of the Communist Party and the Armed Forces for strengthening their military power. The Komsomol organizations in the Soviet army and navy unite young servicemen around the Communist Party and teach them loyalty to Marxism-Leninism, valor and heroism, selfless devotion to the socialist Motherland, and constant readiness to defend her. They motivate youth to master combat materiel and weaponry, and to successfully complete the tasks of combat and political training, as well as to observe without deviation the requirements of military discipline and the principles of the moral code of a builder of communism." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 105.

¹⁰⁷ "Handbook of the Soviet Armed Forces", DDB-2680-40-78, *Defense Intelligence Agency*, February 1978, pp. 2-6.

¹⁰⁸ **Party-political work** (Partiynno-politicheskaya rabota) "A most important means of strengthening the moral and political conditions of personnel, enhancing the combat effectiveness and combat readiness of troops, and mobilizing personnel to successful completion of combat mission for the purpose of achieving the utter defeat of the enemy. Party-political work is accomplished by all commanders (and chiefs), by political organs, and by Party and Komsomol organizations." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 153.

time was **political training of military personnel**.¹⁰⁹ Like the old political commissars, the modern zampolit remained responsible for keeping soldiers, and even entire front-line combat units, from deserting or defecting. The **political work in combat situation** was very important part of the political officer's activity.¹¹⁰ All levels of the Party's military-political structure paid great attention to preparing political officers for conducting political work in combat situations. Usually, this training was organized during joint military exercises of the armed forces of WTO countries to provide exchanges of opinion among political officers of different countries. Without any doubt, the Soviet view in this matters dominated.

Political officers of the Warsaw Pact countries had a full responsibility for maintaining high **political-moral fighting qualities** of military personnel of their military unit.¹¹¹ That is why among all other duties the zampolits were responsible for resolving

¹⁰⁹ **Political training of Soviet Armed Forces personnel** (Politicheskaya podgotovka lichnogo sostava Sovetskikh Vooruzhennykh Sil) "A system of measures for the ideological and political education of personnel. It includes: political sessions with soldiers, sailors, sergeants, and senior NCO's; training of generals, admirals and officers in the tenets of Marxism-Leninism; political education of servicemen and their families, and of Army and Navy civilian workers and employees (evening courses in Marxism-Leninism, Party schools, groups, and seminars)." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.

¹¹⁰ **Political work in combat situation** (Politicheskaya rabota v boyevoy obstanovke) "The system of measures in propaganda, agitation, and political education, implemented by political organs, Party and Komsomol organizations, commanders, and political workers, among servicemen and the civilian population in the zone of combat operations, and also among enemy armed forces personnel and population." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.

¹¹¹ **Political-moral fighting qualities of armed forces personnel** (Politiko-moralnyye i boyevyye kachestva lichnogo sostava vooruzhennykh sil) "The moral-political, combat, psychological, and intellectual qualities which are needed by a serviceman in modern warfare. Political-moral combat qualities that are cultivated in the Soviet Armed Forces include a high level of social awareness and devotion to the Motherland and the ideals of Communism; proletarian internationalism; faithfulness to the oath and to military comradeship; hatred of enemies; alertness; consciousness of military duty; heroism; willingness for self-sacrifice for the sake of victory over the enemy; a high level of discipline; a

morale, disciplinary, and interpersonal problems. In this terms, negative reports from the zampolit could exert considerable influence on a commander's career. Smaller military units had **Primary Party Organizations** (PPO). Each PPO had a secretary, and secretaries met in their regiment's or ship's party committee to elect a party bureau.¹¹² The Party organizations within the armed forces and the Main Political Directorate "*had international ideological functions. The political education they provided had to deepen "proletarian internationalism" among the Soviet military and other armies of the Warsaw Pact...In practice, "internationalism" meant subordination of the national interest to geopolitical considerations imposed by the Soviet Union.*"¹¹³ There were a variety of MPD tasks in the Communist countries. For example, in the Polish People's Army even the Army chaplains were directly subordinated by MPD.¹¹⁴

The *Special Departments* was another instrument of party control over the armed forces. The history of the Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces dates back to 1918. Since the 1918, an important internal security function of the security police has

sense of military honor; courage; initiative; respect for combat materiel; etc." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), p. 166.

¹¹² **Party organizations in the armed forces** (Partiynnye organizatsii v vooruzhennykh silakh) "Party organizations uniting Party members in unit (warships), in military educational institutions, and in establishments. The principal task of Party organizations is to implement requirements of the Program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, namely, that the Soviet Armed Forces shall be an efficient and coordinated organism, having a high level of organization and discipline, fulfilling in an exemplary manner the missions assigned to them by the Party, the government and the people, and being ready at any moment to inflict a shattering repulsive blow against imperialist aggressors." *Dictionary of Basic and Military Terms (A Soviet View)* (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1965), translated by the U.S. Air Force (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), pp. 153- 154.

¹¹³ Rudolf Joo, p. 17-18.

¹¹⁴ Rudolf Joo, p. 18, and George C. Malcher, *Poland's Politicized Army*, (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984), pp. 227-229.

been ensuring the political reliability of the Soviet Armed Forces. Special Departments (Osobyie Otdely) were under the supervision of the KGB's Third Chief Directorate. Officially designated as a military counterintelligence organization, the Third Chief Directorate performed tasks that extended far beyond counterintelligence to encompass extensive political surveillance of the military and other military security duties.¹¹⁵

The Special departments used networks of informers inside military units and were responsible for:

- a) monitoring foreign contacts of armed forces personnel and protection military secrets;
- b) security clearances of military personnel and ensuring that security regulations and procedures strictly observed in all branches of the armed forces;
- c) control of military personnel files and information relating to the political reliability of members of the armed forces.

According to opinion of political researcher Amy W. Knight, the Special departments were in a position of much greater authority than the MPD.

Firstly, special departments themselves had officials within the MPD who monitored the activity of its personnel.

Secondly, the Special Departments operated with more autonomy vis-à-vis the central party apparatus.

¹¹⁵ W. Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Orbis*, Summer 1984. pp. 257-280.

Thirdly, the actual direction of the KGB and its Special Departments was implemented at the highest level, the Politburo. For example, from 1973 until 1982 the KGB chairman Yuri Andropov, was a full member of that body.¹¹⁶

A key element of special department activities was political surveillance on both a formal and an informal level. Unknown to a commander or zampolit, an officer of special department could be reporting on their political attitudes, outside of the military or the Main Political Directorate channels.

E. CONCLUSIONS:

1. Under communism, the armed forces of in the Communist states of Europe were under the complete control not only of their national communist parties but also the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet Government and Warsaw Pact Organization.
2. The relationship between the East European Communist Parties and the armed forces formed a unique pattern of civil-military relations in the East European Communist Countries (EECC).
3. The Soviet Union exercised control over the EECC through political, economic and military mechanisms at the domestic level, the bilateral level, and the multinational level.

¹¹⁶ See Amy W. Knight, "The KGB's Special Departments in the Soviet Armed Forces," *Orbis*, Summer 1984. p. 277.

4. Each state's domestic communist party apparatus had to submit to Soviet authority through bilateral and economic agreements. In addition, the mechanisms of the multinational Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) controlled the armed forces of the East European Communist Countries.

5. Strong Soviet mechanisms of control guaranteed Soviet hegemony and existence of the illegitimate communist regimes of Eastern Europe.

6. To understand the nature of civil-military relations in the EECC one has to take into account the domination of civil-military relations of Soviet-communist political system in general. The structure and functions of the Party and the Governments in the EECC were very similar to those in the Soviet Union.

7. The Communist Party's control over the armed forces was not truly democratic because its institutions lacked the basic requirements of democratic control and accountability.

8. The Communist Party had three firm mechanisms of control over the country's armed forces.

First, the top military leaders had been systematically integrated into the highest echelons of the Political Bureau, the Communist Party Central Committee, and subjected to party discipline.

Second, the Communist party has placed a network of political officers throughout the armed forces to influence the activities of the military.

Third, the special departments, under the direction of the Communist party, maintained a network of officers and informers in the armed forces.

As a result, one can summarize all of the above in one final conclusion: **civil-military relations of the former Warsaw Pact countries had unique, but highly undemocratic characteristics.**

IV. ENDS AND MEANS OF REFORM: POLAND'S ROAD TO DEMOCRATIC CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE ARMED FORCES

A. PROBLEMS AND DIFFICULTIES OF CHANGE OF CIVIL- MILITARY RELATIONS

Hungarian scholar Rudolf Joo has said: *"Civil-military relations mirror the society and the political regime in which they are built up. Currently, in Central and Eastern Europe they reflect a transitory society and political system in which old and new elements coexist. Old and new laws, institutions and policy-making mechanisms, each designed to serve a very different power structure, frequently exist side-by side"*¹¹⁷

The transformation process in the former Communist countries faces profound difficulties of change. Rudolf Joo has listed and examined common problems and difficulties of all Partner countries on the way to democratic transformation. According to him, the process of transformations from communist to democratic control over the armed forces is equally difficult for both the civilian and the military side. In general, the civilian side faces the following problems and difficulties:

*Firstly, "there was virtually no civilian expertise on defense and security matters."*¹¹⁸

Under the communist regime these issues were excluded from public debate due to military secrecy. Because of the strict policy of the communist parties not many civil servants in the former WTO countries had enough knowledge on military and national

¹¹⁷ Rudolf Joo, "The Democratic Control of Armed Forces: The Experience of Hungary," *Chaillot Paper* No 23; Institute for Security Studies Western European Union, Paris-February 1996, p. 20.

¹¹⁸ Rudolf Joo, p.21.

security matters.¹¹⁹ In such a complicated situation the control by civilian administrators can become more of a formality than a reality within the defense ministries of the former WTO countries.

*Secondly, "in some countries of the former Warsaw Pact, for example, Czechoslovakia, for various reasons of recent or more distant history, the civil population harbored explicit anti-military feelings".*¹²⁰

Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, a leading Hungarian analyst and researcher of civil-military relations argues: *"Public support for the military is an important prerequisite for stable civil-military relations in democratic society. The public support requires an understanding of the military and of its professional and social needs. The media, the government's own public-relations policies and research institutes... play an important role in informing the public. However, in post-Warsaw Pact Central Europe, the media's role has tended to be more ambiguous and can become easily politicized."*¹²¹

In order to understand strong negative anti-military public opinion in the particular case of the Czech Republic, we should take into account real historical facts that *"neither the Czech, Slovak, nor the Czechoslovak militaries have actually fought for national independence or to defend the country."*¹²² They fought against Germany in France, Italy and Russia and proved themselves good soldiers on the battlefields of the First World War, but they didn't fight directly for the Czecho-Slovak homeland. In 1938, in spite of

¹¹⁹ Chris Donnelly, op. cit. p. 7; Peter M.E. Volten, *"On Annualizing Civil-Military Relations,"* a research outline, manuscript, Centre for European Security Studies, University of Groningen, 1994, p. 8.

¹²⁰ Rudolf Joo, pp. 22-23.

¹²¹ Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 54.

¹²² Re'ka Szemerke'nyi, p. 55.

initial military mobilization and readiness of the armed forces to defend their country, the politicians made the decision *"not to take up arms against Hitler's army."*¹²³ In 1968 the Czech's Armed Forces maintained neutrality in the face of the invasion of Warsaw Pact's joint armed forces. Hence, Czech society has a negative attitude and subsequent skepticism toward the military.¹²⁴

*Thirdly, "the concept of civilian control and political neutrality has not always been correctly understood by the (civilian) politicians of the new democracies".*¹²⁵

In order to eliminate communist ideology and its consequences from the military body, the democratically consolidated political parties and fronts tried to enforce the process of propagation of democratic liberal world views. This process sometimes was so intensive for traditionally conservative military mind that number of officers considered this democratic efforts as a new political indoctrination.¹²⁶

As mentioned above, the process of democratization and reform of civil-military relations in the former Communist countries faces difficulties not only on the civilian, but also the military side. These might be characterized thus:

*First, the military has had no experience of working with civilians in top positions within an MOD or parliament."*¹²⁷

¹²³ Ibid., p. 55.

¹²⁴ For more information see Stefan Sarvas, "Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic," (Prague: Institute of International Relations, October 1995).

¹²⁵ Rudolf Joo, p.23.

¹²⁶ Ibid., p. 23.

¹²⁷ Ibid., p.23.

The ministries of defense of WTO countries were completely militarized. All important positions there were occupied only by soldiers. The civilian personnel was in a minority and could occupy just only technical assistance category with low-paid jobs. Unlike civil servants, military personnel received a good salary and had full respect of the political leaders and the society as well. This situation promoted the view that military stood not as guardians of the countries but also as the best part of the society. It became something of a closed caste. The process of 'civilianization' of ministries of defense during the democratic transformation changed that situation directly to the opposite. *"With the arrival of a civilian minister and some top civilian aides, the respective positions have been altered drastically"*.¹²⁸

Second, "as a general rule, the armed forces had a positive attitude towards democratic transition. Nevertheless, because of their previous relative isolation within society, the military perhaps had more difficulty than many other groups in adapting to the new, practical day-to-day conditions of a pluralistic democracy and a market economy".¹²⁹

The military lived in virtual isolation, with its own housing and clubs. Because of its strict internal regulations they had little knowledge about open society and pluralism. Criticism or open public debate was considered as an ideological aggression from the West.

¹²⁸ Rudolf Joo, p.23.

¹²⁹Ibid., p.24.

*Third, "until the end of the 1980s, military servicemen could not take advantage of the limited, but on occasion, steadily increasing personal contacts with the West and opportunities offered by tourism."*¹³⁰

Unfamiliarity with the culture of other countries, lack of experience in international contacts combined with an inability to speak Western languages led to a certain fear of the unknown. As a psychological barrier this phenomenon had a negative impact on democratic transformation of the armed forces and civil-military relations. It limited the dynamism of the reorientation of professional contacts with the Western European and Europe-Atlantic communities.¹³¹

Worsening budgetary conditions also have been a very serious problem that has hampered the smooth development of civil-military relations. In almost all countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the last years were characterized by a considerable reduction of the armed forces and cutting of the defense budget. The economic imbalance has led to a situation in which in almost all former Warsaw Pact countries a large number of well-trained young officers left the armed forces and entered the private sector, where incomes are four to five times better than those in the armed forces. *"Officers have expressed the opinion they are not understood and that their interests are not taken into consideration."*¹³²

¹³⁰Ibid., p. 24.

¹³¹Rudolf Joo, pp. 24-25, and Anton Bebler, "The Evolution of Civil-Military Relations in Central and Eastern Europe," *NATO Review*, August 1994, p. 30.

¹³² Rudolf Joo, p.25.

B. TASKS OF REFORMING OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN POLAND AND PROGRESS OF CHANGES

Jeffrey Simon, a leading American social science specialist in national military strategy and threat analysis, has mentioned several stages in democratic transition of civil-military relation of Poland. The process of democratic transformation started in Poland after the martial law period (1981-1985). In 1988 General W. Jaruzelski, the President of the State Council and the leader of the ruling Polish United Worker's Party (PUWP) as well, took the initiative to open "Roundtable Talks" with the democratic opposition.¹³³ As a result, "The Polish United Worker's Party's (PUWP) recognized political and trade union pluralism in return for the creation of a powerful new office of president."¹³⁴ Early in the winter of 1989, "roundtable talks" began between the ruling Communist elite and

¹³³ **Roundtable Talks in Poland.** "In the late 1980s, popular anger was becoming ever more visible in Polish society, and social and political tensions were reaching a dangerous point. This atmosphere threatened the communist government with the complete collapse of its policies and the repudiation of the communist system. The leaders of the armed forces, except General Wojciech Jaruzelski, declared that they were not willing to repeat the experience of the Poznan riots of 1956, or the firing on the people in 1976. In addition, the Soviet leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, made it quite clear that Soviet tanks would not be given orders to save the communist regimes in Eastern Europe. The result in Poland was that the government was forced to sit down with the opposition in order to work out some form of consensus and to settle the future of the Polish republic. This was an unprecedented development in the history of Polish communism. The roundtable discussions, as the negotiations were called, began in 1988. The talks centered at first on the status of the Polish economy and the steps needed to make it work again. This time, the discussions included the best economic experts that could be found in Poland regardless of their political view. The discussion, however, led to agreements only on short-term economic measures, not to the acceptance of fundamental reforms. The creation of a new economic system was postponed until after the elections to be held in June 1989. The elections resulted in an overwhelming victory for the Solidarity party, and, when a new Polish government was formed, it included noncommunist ministers, for the first time since 1948. In the final count, the Roundtable discussions did not accomplish much; however, they did contribute to a peaceful transition of power from the communists to the opposition, a process that would have been unthinkable only a few years before." Joseph Held, *Dictionary of East European History Since 1945*, Greenwood Press, 1994, p. 365. For more information about Roundtable discussions see also: Anna Sabbat-Swidlicka, "Poland: A Year of Three Governments," *Radio Free Europe Research Report* 1.1 (January 1, 1993), pp. 102-107; Louisa Vinton, "Poland: The Anguish of Transition," *Radio Free Europe Research Report* 1.1 (January 3, 1991), pp. 91-95.

¹³⁴ Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, McNair Paper 39, April 1995, p. 39.

the Solidarity leaders. During this period parliamentary changes were made as were important reforms of Constitution that had a great influence on the nature of political control over the military.

In April of 1989, a Constitutional amendment changed the Defense Council's (KOK) role.¹³⁵ It became a collegial state organ which was subordinated to the Parliament. According to amendment, it must work in the defense and national security areas for establishing general principles of national defense, including defense doctrine. After this constitutional change the KOK included the President of Poland, the prime minister and also the ministers of defense and foreign affairs as their deputies. The head of the President's Office, the minister of finance, internal affairs, chief of the general staff and the minister heading the office of the Council of Ministers also have become members of KOK.¹³⁶

These accords opened the *second stage of democratic transformation*-the first contested parliamentary elections in June 1989. As a result, in August 1989 a new noncommunist government formed under the leader of the democratic opposition, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. In 1989 the peaceful transition from the Jaruzelski regime to the popularly elected Solidarity-led government had little immediate impact on the organization of the Polish military. General Florian Siwicki, who had been Jaruzelski's

¹³⁵ Polish Defense Council (KOK) played a very important role during the communist period as a supergovernmental agency that subordinated the defense and interior ministries to Communist party. For more information see Leslaw Dudek, "On the Defense Doctrine of the Third Republic of Poland," *Polska Zbrojna*, 10-12 July 1992, p. III.

¹³⁶ Polish Army: Facts and Figures (In the Transition Period) (Warsaw: Ministry of National Defense, 1991), pp. 9-12, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 43.

minister of national defense, served in the first cabinet of noncommunist Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki. General Wojciech Jaruzelski, leader of PUWP and military commander in chief, was elected president of Poland by majority of parliament. In fact, the presidency was restored just to serve as the locus of authority over the military and the police, but the election of a noncommunist government in June 1989 completely changed the political situation.¹³⁷

Under Mazowiecki, Siwicki directed military reforms until he was replaced in mid-1990. This stage of reform had not only to make necessary changes to establish a constitutional framework and clarify the line of authority between different branches of government but also included the restoration of a positive image of armed forces in society. As it is known, the restoration of military prestige is one of the main building blocks in democratic reform of armed forces. The military partly lost their positive reputation in their own eyes and, furthermore, in the eyes of Polish society. The country's communist guardians used the Polish armed forces to solve domestic problems:

- a) during the strike in Poznan in 1956 and in Gdansk and Szczecin in 1970;
- b) in Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968; and
- c) for implementing of martial law in 1980-1981.¹³⁸

¹³⁷ Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (ed. by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner) The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996, p.103.

¹³⁸ **Poznan Riots of June 1956.** "Poznan is located in central Poland on the Warta river. The city developed rapidly during the twentieth century, and its port has become a major point of embarkation for the Polish export-import trade. It also became a center of machine tool and chemical industries. In June 1956, the workers of the city responded to sudden price increases of food and other consumer goods by strikers, demonstrations, and riots. The communist government ordered the army and the secret police to suppress the riots by any means necessary. The troops fired on the demonstrators killing over 50 people

The next serious problem was that "*Poland's new leadership inherited empty political 'traditions'*".¹³⁹ The disappearance of Poland from the political map of Europe in 1795 and the establishment the almost total political and military control of the Soviet Union over Poland in 1945 had negative influence on developing Poland's political leadership. In pre-communist Poland there was a tradition of giving dictatorial power to military leaders during times of crisis-especially during the fight for independence. As a result, the Polish military was seen as the guardian of certain national and soldierly traditions. The military also saw itself as representing the national interest. During the twenty years of the Second Republic (1918-1939), tensions between the armed forces and the civilian government resulted in the military coup. In May 1926 a semi-military rule was established by Marshal Joseph Pilsudski. It followed after his death in 1935 by a power-

and wounding more than 300. This action raised general indignation throughout Poland. The People's Army, so called, killing ordinary people! The army was deeply shaken by its role in Poznan. Its officers and recruits were on the verge of mutiny. The generals declared that, in case of a Soviet invasion, they would order the troops to fight."

Gdansk Riots. "*Originally an ancient Slav settlement, located on a branch of the Vistula river at the Gulf of Gdansk, the city was a member of the Hanseatic League in the course of the thirteenth century. Since that time, the majority of the population consisted of German craftsmen and merchants. The city was also a point at which German and Polish nationalism collided, and it provided the spark for the outbreak of World War II. During the communist era, Gdansk was a busy Polish port on the Baltic sea. Its huge Shipyard, one of the largest in the world, served as a source of shipbuilding for the Soviet Union and other East European countries. The shipyard workers included some of the best-known people in Poland in the 1970s and 1980s, among them Lech Walesa and Anna Walentynowicz. In 1970, when riots broke out in Poznan and the Polish army fired on the demonstrating workers, the unrest spread to Gdansk, where it eventually led to the formation of an Inter-factory Strike Committee, a forerunner of the Solidarity trade union. Disturbances occurred in Gdansk in 1976 and 1980; the 1980 disturbances led to the building of Solidarity. This organization was eventually instrumental in the destruction of the communist regime and the transformation of Poland into a democratic society.*" Joseph Held, "Dictionary of East European History Since 1945," Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 331, 359. For more information see also: Konrad Syrop, *Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution of 1956* (London, 1958); Andrzej Korbonski, "Poland, 1918-1990," in Joseph Held, ed. *The Columbia History of Eastern Europe in the Twentieth Century* (New York, 1992); Flora Lewis, *The Polish Volcano* (London, 1959).

¹³⁹ Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, McNair Paper 39, April 1995, p.40.

sharing between the civilians and the military. We should also take into account the fact that during the short period of independence of Poland from 1919 to 1939 "*having been formed from three different empires-German, Austro-Hungarian, and Russian-and having no more than 60 percent of its population as Polish, Poland was neither state nor a nation.*"¹⁴⁰ Consequently, the military in Poland played different roles in this difficult period.¹⁴¹ It must be also admitted that the imposition of the communist regime in Poland after World War II created a totally new situation for civil-military relations. The military was completely subordinated, not to the state, but to the Communist Party through a system of political commissars. The military was also subordinated to Moscow and the requirements of the Warsaw Pact. Moscow determined Poland's defense policy. There was a penchant for secrecy within the army so that military matters were never discussed between military and civilian leaders. Moreover, the military lived in virtual isolation, with its own housing and clubs. As a result, there was little civilian knowledge of military affairs. Under General Wojciech Jaruzelski the armed forces became the key institution of the system.¹⁴² From February 1981 he served as prime minister and since October 1981 also as first secretary of the ruling PUWP.¹⁴³

¹⁴⁰ Jeffrey Simon, pp. 40-41.

¹⁴¹ Jeffrey Simon, p. 41, and Andrej Korbonski, "Civil-Military Relations In Poland Between the Wars: 1918-1939," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 14, No.2 (Winter 1988), pp. 173-176.

¹⁴² **Jaruzelski, Wojciech** (1923-). "*Jaruzelski has been a military officer most of his life. He fought against the Germans in World War II and survived the war. He joined the Polish communist party in 1944 and, in 1956, rose to the rank of general. In 1960, he became the armed forces' representative in the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers party. He was, thus, a political general. At one point in his career, he was appointed to membership in the military command of the Warsaw Pact forces. He was a fully convinced Marxist-Leninist, and, accordingly, the Soviet leaders completely trusted the Polish general. On December 13, 1981, Jaruzelski took over the government of a Poland torn by strife between striking workers and the communist regime. Jaruzelski, arguing that if he had not acted, the Soviet army would have marched into Poland, declared martial law, outlawed the Solidarity trade union and, had its*

Taking into consideration all the above one must conclude that the agenda of rebuilding of civil-military relations and restoration of military prestige within society were the most important issues during this stage of Polish political reform. Despite difficulties mentioned above, military reform, including the idea of democratic political control, made some progress. After the 1989 elections, Parliament, and first of all Solidarity's leaders, started to provide reliable control of the military. In order to oversee the military, to remove influence of communists and to provide reliable governmental control over the defense ministry, reforms made several important steps, but not without some missteps, as well.

First, they created the Home Defense Committee to provide civilian control over the defense ministry. It was headed by the president and included the prime minister, the minister of defense and minister of interior affairs. The Minister of Finance and the speakers of the Sejm and Senate were also included in this structure.¹⁴⁴

*leaders and supporters arrested and thrown into jail. He also took control over the secret police and used it for the restoration of calm in Poland. Jaruzelski was fully supported by Leonid Brezhnev and his Soviet colleagues. In 1982, new demonstrations erupted in Poland against martial law, and these were put down with great brutality on Jaruzelski's orders by the secret police. The Western powers introduced an embargo on Polish goods. In 1983, therefore, Jaruzelski was forced to lift martial law, but this did not bring about the end of general repression of the dissenters. Two years later, Jaruzelski stepped down from the post of prime minister, but he remained head of the Polish United Workers party. An obedient parliament, filled with communist deputies, elected him president of the republic, so that he retained considerable power. In 1989, when the communist regime collapsed, the opposition agreed to Jaruzelski continued presidency. However, in the free elections of 1990, Jaruzelski was replaced by Lech Walesa, his former Solidarity opponent as president of Poland." Joseph Held, "Dictionary of East European History Since 1945," Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 339-340. For more information about Wojciech Jaruzelski and this dramatic period of Polish history see: Ash, Timothy, Garton, *The Polish Revolution* (London, 1985); George Malcher, *Poland's Politicized Army* (New York, 1984); Bronislaw Misztal, *Poland after Solidarity: Social Movements Versus the State* (New Brunswick, NJ, 1985).*

¹⁴³ For more information see Jerzy J. Wiatr, "The Political Role of the Military in a New Democracy: Poland," in Constantine Danopolous and Cyntia Watson, eds., *The Political Role of the Military: An International Handbook* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1996).

¹⁴⁴ Polish Army: Facts and Figures, (1990), pp. 11-12, and Jeffrey. Simon, p.44.

Second, they created a Sejm Commission for Defense which had the right to enter any military installation on demand.

Third, they created Social Consultative Council of the ministry of national defense (MON) which included all representatives of the political parties and groups in the Sejm. The Council had an inspection authority, and supervised the social conditions of the military and the education.¹⁴⁵

Fourth, the Council of Ministers established the Political Advisory Committee which consisted of members of Parliament and a representative of the president. The aim of the committee was to examine issues and provide consultations on questions coming within the defense ministry's power. The committee had an advisory role without any authority to contradict the chain of command of the army.¹⁴⁶

Fifth, an important step was made when two Solidarity civilian leaders became Poland's first civilian deputy defense ministers. They were Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz. Having received responsibility for educational (former political) training within the armed forces and international military affairs respectively they aimed to dismantle the Main Political Administration and thus take over military's international contacts. This reform represented the first attempt to provide direct civilian control over two important areas in defense policy. As a result of this policy in order to depoliticize the

¹⁴⁵ Jeffrey Simon, p.44.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., p. 45.

military Mazowiecki dismantled the Main Political Administration (MPA) and created a Central Education Board.¹⁴⁷

Finally, a significant step toward to democratic civilian control over the military was made by the democratically consolidated Polish government when in February 1990 the new military doctrine was adopted. It underlined not only parliamentary and presidential control of the armed forces but also highlighted the national interest in a vastly different European strategic situation although Poland was still *de jure* a member of the Warsaw Pact: *"The Superior of the Armed Forces is the President of the Polish Republic. The Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces...in wartime is appointed by the Sejm. In the event of war an appropriate operational grouping remaining under national command and acting as part of the Combined Armed Forces...of the Warsaw Pact, is isolated from within the Armed Forces of the Polish Republic. The authorities of the Polish Republic...retain their influence on decisions affecting the use of that grouping in consonance with national interests."*¹⁴⁸

After the presidential elections in Poland in December 1990 which brought Lech Walesa to the presidency and the appointment of Jan Bielecki as the second non-communist prime minister in January 1991 started *third stage of democratic transformation*.¹⁴⁹ This period can be characterized as a situation when "conflicts

¹⁴⁷ Thomas S. Szayna, *The Military in a Postcommunist Poland*, RAND, N-3309-USDR, 1991, p. 26, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 45.

¹⁴⁸ Jeffrey Simon, *Central European Civil-Military Relations and NATO Expansion* (Washington, DC: National Defense University, McNair Paper 39, April 1995, p.43.

¹⁴⁹ **Walesa, Lech** (1943-). "Walesa was born during World War II, while his father was in a German labor camp, from which he never came out alive. The young Walesa was apprenticed to become an electrician and was employed by the Lenin shipyards at Gdansk. In 1970, when he was twenty-seven years

between the constitutional committees of the communist-dominated Sejm and Solidarity-dominated Senate grew to the point that they broke off all contacts with each other."¹⁵⁰

Walesa launched a new phase of reform in security affairs to strengthen the presidential position by transferring powers from the communist Sejm to the president. Walesa chaired the KOK which provided control over the armed forces and police. He also tried to transform the KOK into National Security Council with full presidential financial control. The President thus created The National Security Bureau (BBN). The purpose of the Bureau was to prepare defense analyses and forecasts of internal and external situation. This body has developed Polish military doctrine and drafts for military reforms.¹⁵¹

In order to expand presidential authority in security affairs, and strengthen executive control over the military, in February 1991 Lech Walesa announced the

old, he participated in the riots that ended with the shooting death of over fifty workers by the hands of the Polish People's Army. This left an impression on him that, from then on, Walesa became a dissident among the workers. In April 1978, Walesa was among the group of people who announced the formation of the Baltic Committee for Free and Independent Trade Unions...Walesa was a member of the group that decided to issue a newspaper, Worker of the Coast. At the end of December 1978, he was fired from his job for his political activity. He found a new job in the Gdansk shipyards as an electrician. However, he continued his clandestine activities, and he was, once again, fired. When new protests erupted in the factories in Gdansk after the sudden price increases in the Summer of 1980, the workers demanded not only that they be withdrawn but also that Walesa be reinstated. He was instrumental in the establishment of Solidarity, and become its most articulate spokesman. On December 31, 1981, he was arrested when martial law was imposed on Poland, together with other leaders of Solidarity and their supporters. Walesa was kept in confinement until 1983 when he was conditionally released. During the Roundtable negotiations in 1988, he was one of the leaders of the workers' representatives. In the presidential elections of 1990, Walesa won the presidency after a runoff." Joseph Held, "Dictionary of East European History Since 1945," Greenwood Press, 1994, pp. 370-371. For more information about Lech Walesa see: Walter Brolewicz, *My Brother Walesa* (New York, 1984); Mary Craig, *Lech Walesa and His Poland* (New York, 1987); Lech Walesa, *A Way of Hope: An Autobiography* (New York, 1987).

¹⁵⁰ Jeffrey Simon, p. 46.

¹⁵¹ Report On Eastern Europe, 22 February 1991, p. 50, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 47.

necessity to install a civilian defense minister in the future.¹⁵² Lech Walesa and Jan Bielecki also announced a great importance of defense reform. According to them, during defense reform the following results had to be reached:

1. transform the defense ministry into a civilian state organ;
2. establish a new structure for the armed forces;
3. make the defense industry much more efficient ;
4. establish in Parliament organizations of democratic civilian control.¹⁵³

From Prime Minister Bielecki's view the aims of this reform were :*"to improve the army's image, and credibility, to put the defense ministry under civilian control, and to make the armed forces a separate, apolitical organization."*¹⁵⁴

According to the plan of defense reform, three following civilian deputy of defense ministers would be appointed:

1) "a deputy minister for educational affairs (formerly for social relations and education), responsible for setting educational and cultural policy within the armed forces and for organizing cooperation with the military chaplains' service;

2) a deputy for defense policy and planning, responsible for developing defense policy and a long-range concept for developing the armed forces to deal with Poland's external threats;

*3) a deputy minister for armaments and military infrastructure, responsible for the defense industry and for delivery, repair, and upgrading of weaponry and material."*¹⁵⁵

¹⁵² Lech Walesa interview, *Polska Zbrojna*, 1-3 February 1991, pp. 1,2. *FBIS-EEU-91-024* (5 February 1991), p. 36. Walesa received Sejm approval in July 1991, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 48.

¹⁵³ Jeffrey Simon, p. 48.

¹⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 48.

¹⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p.48.

Unfortunately, these and many others efforts were stalled because of tensions between the communist-dominated Sejm, on the one hand, and the Senate and the president, on the other. Anyway, toward the end of third stage of democratic transformation, Poland made yet further progress toward democratic civilian control over the military:

First, Poland depoliticized the army on the old model by dismantling all Communist Party organs and eliminating the political officers.

Second, Poland secured the loyalty of the military to the new government.

Third, Poland modified and then ended the ties between the military and Moscow.

This step required a strategic reorientation and a developing of Poland's capability to determine its own defense policies.

C. CRISIS IN CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY

The *fourth stage of democratic transformation* started after the full Sejm and Senate democratic elections held on 27 October 1991. The *fifth stage* started after the fall 1993 Sejm and Senate elections, with the return of the socialists and the constitutional crisis in Poland.¹⁵⁶ Although during the last two stages of democratic transformations, Poland initiated an extensive domestic defense reform to provide civilian control and extensive restructuring of the military, and returned the armed forces to the people, one must also characterize this period as a serious crisis in Polish civil-military relations. Due to the unclear division of authority over the military, soldiers often became an object of

¹⁵⁶ Jeffrey Simon, p. 39.

political clashes and thus politicized. These clashes emerged because of ambiguities in the Constitution over supreme command of the armed forces.¹⁵⁷

After the parliamentary election in October 1991, Lech Walesa failed to win a political base in the new Parliament which was dominated by the right-wing parties. Prime Minister Jan Olszewski, who led new Parliament's coalition government, appointed Jan Parys as a defense minister. In fact, he was the first civilian defense minister of Poland. In this internal political situation, with the absence of a new constitution, Walesa conducted the same policy toward national security affairs and control over the armed forces as before. With the purpose to create a forum for providing executive presidential control over security and defense matter on 31 December 1991, he published a decree about the structure and functions of the National Security Council (NSC).¹⁵⁸ In accordance with the decree, NSC was chaired by President Walesa, as a Superior of the Armed Forces, included Prime Minister Olszewski, as NSC's first deputy chairman, Defense Minister Jan Parys and National Security Bureau (BBN) Chief Jerzy Milewski as a deputies. Other members of NSC included of the both speakers of Parliament (the Sejm and Senate), the minister of foreign affairs, the minister of finance, the minister of internal affairs, the chief of staff, and one of the secretaries of state from the president's chancellery. The distinction between the NSC and BBN was that NSC had to consider national security, defense,

¹⁵⁷ Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (ed. by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner) The Jones Hopkins University Press, 1996, pp. 105-106.

¹⁵⁸ Jeffrey Simon, p. 50.

public security, order and citizens security matters. The BBN was responsible for identifying threats to security and preparing appropriate solutions to meet them.¹⁵⁹

In spite of Walesa's effort to strengthen the executive branch the new defense minister acted on his own. He retired Inspector General of the Armed Forces, Admiral Kolodziejczyc, from active service without even informing the president in advance and announced that he would not appoint a new Inspector General until "*Parliament amended the Constitution.*"¹⁶⁰ Soon afterwards two deputies of the Minister of Defense, Komorowski and Onyszkiewicz, left their positions. Relations between the Minister of Defense and the president deteriorated rapidly, because of the ambiguity of constitutional provisions concerning democratic civilian control over the military. As Jeffrey Simon stated: "*The crisis arose over different interpretations of presidential and defense ministerial authority as well as over policy and personality differences. It ended with the resignation of the new (and first) civilian defense minister, exacerbated Polish civil-military relations, and brought the collapse of the new, though weak, government coalition... The powers of the president, prime minister, and parliament need to be clarified and until such a constitution has been adopted, Polish defense reform can not be achieved.*"¹⁶¹

Hence, one can conclude that the ambiguity of constitutional provisions and differences in interpretations concerning command and control over the military not only

¹⁵⁹ Jeffrey Simon, pp. 50-51.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 52.

¹⁶¹ Ibid, p. 52.

contributed to the downfall of the first civilian Minister of Defense of Poland but also discredited the idea of civilian leadership of the military. As a result, after 1992 the Polish General Staff under General Wilecki's leadership acted to increase its autonomy with full support of the President. The threat to democracy was real. According to Jan Parys, there was a *"political struggle going on in Poland, a struggle over the future of the political system in Poland: whether the system will be democratic or whether dictatorship will prevail."*¹⁶² Finally, it resulted in a new constitutional crisis in September 1994.

The adoption of the 'Small Constitution' in November 1992 was the first attempt to clarify legislative and executive authority and to define the president's and government's change, but in reality it was a hybrid "presidential-parliamentary" system. Without doubt, it was a real political victory of President Walesa. The Constitution reaffirmed the role and president's authority in foreign policy and national security affairs (Articles 32 and 34). According to Article 35, the President remained the head of State and the commander-in-chief of the armed forces. The 'Small Constitution' specified that peacetime command of the Polish Army be exercised by the president of the republic and by the prime minister and the Council of Ministers. The president determines the composition of military advisory bodies in peacetime and the composition of a war staff in wartime. After consultation with the prime minister, the president appoints a minister of national defense, after consultation with the minister of national defense, he appoints the

¹⁶² "Kariera szefa sztabu," *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 6 February, 1995.

chief of the General Staff. In turn, the minister is to consult with the president on appointment of commanders of military districts and the individual services.¹⁶³

Supreme command of the military became again an issue between the President and Cabinet when the electoral victory returned the former Communists and their allies to power in September 1993. The new cabinet was headed by the leader of the Social Democratic Party (SDP) Waldemar Pawlak and consisted of the coalition of two left-centered parties. Originally, the new cabinet adopted the policy of cooperation with the president. It seemed that the president and the cabinet would be able to provide a stable and effective system of democratic control of the armed forces, but Walesa wanted to prevent the growth of leftist influence within the armed forces.¹⁶⁴

According to Walesa's wish Admiral Piotr Kolodziejczyk was appointed as defense minister. He claimed that he was a "*civilian minister and would...set an example of how a civilian minister of national defense should work.*"¹⁶⁵ He also added that "*the most urgent issue that the Sejm would have to deal with was the new law on general defense duties, which would result in a precise distribution of powers in controlling the state's defense matters.*"¹⁶⁶

¹⁶³ "A Little Constitution in Poland," East European Constitutional Review, Vol. 1, No. 3 (Fall 1992), pp. 12-13., Louisa Vinton, "Poland's Little Constitution Clarifies Walesa's Powers," RFE/RL Research Report, vol. 1, No.35, 4 September 1992.

¹⁶⁴ In accordance with Article 61 of the Small Constitution, a Prime Minister is required to consult with a President regarding the appointment of the ministers of defense, foreign affairs and interior affairs. However, the coalition allowed Walesa to appoint them by his own. For more information see Jeffrey Simon, pp.62-63.

¹⁶⁵ Warsaw Rzeczpospolita, 27 October 1993, p. 2. FBIS-EEU-93-207 (28 October 1993), p. 21, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 63.

¹⁶⁶ Jeffrey Simon, p. 63.

In November 1993 Walesa decided to reorganize KOK into NSC (National Security Council) to have NSC as a highest organ responsible for defense and security under the president. A government Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM) that was headed by the prime minister, would carry out the decisions of NSC. In this case the constitutional changes including constitutional provision were needed, but the KOK continued to operate without any constitutional amendment.¹⁶⁷

Despite the adoption of "Small constitution", the necessity to define by law the functions of the defense ministry and the General Staff remained unsolved as well as the main issue: the absence of constitutional and legal provision for the scope of the president's and prime minister's authority. By the end of January 1994 the Minister of Defense raised the question regarding the evolution of security institutions. He again insisted that *"the Sejm needed to adopt appropriate constitutional and legal provisions to define the scope of the president's and prime minister's authority...In addition, it was necessary to amend the Small Constitution and the Law on General Duty of Defense of the Republic to very precisely divide powers between the civilian defense minister and the General Staff."*¹⁶⁸

In May 1994, the minister of defense presented to the first session of the Council of the Ministers Committee for Defense Affairs (KSORM) a document-"Defense Problem and Military Aspects of the Polish Republic's Security Policies". It proposed that three branches of the armed forces-the land, air forces and navy-would be subordinated to the

¹⁶⁷Ibid., p. 65.

¹⁶⁸Ibid., p. 63.

Chief of Staff. His title would be changed to General Inspector of the Armed Forces. It was also assumed that General Inspector of the Armed Forces would be subordinated to the Minister of Defense. President Walesa, in turn, disagreed with this idea. The direct conflict between the President and the Minister of Defense became unavoidable. In June 1994, the KOK recommended to the Council of Ministers a document: 'Fundamental Problems of the Polish Defense System'. This paper was similar to defense minister's document, but with just only one exception. The core issue of this document-the subordination of the Chief of Staff to the Minister of Defense-was omitted.¹⁶⁹

Soon afterwards, the open conflict of civil-military relations between the President and government took place at September's senior army generals meeting at the Drawsko Pomorskie training ground. The chief of Staff General Jan Wilecki supported Walesa's wish to subordinate the general staff directly to the President of Poland, rather than to the Minister of Defense. He refused to support the defense minister when President Walesa polled the officers on Kolodziejczyk's competence. The officers took a vote of no-confidence in defense minister Piotr Kolodziejczyk. To investigate this matter, a special commission of the Sejm Defense Committee was established by the Parliament. In answers to the questions of the commissions about carrying out orders of the civilian defense ministers General Wilecki said: *"I always have, and will continue to do so."* Kolodziejczyk countered, *"I reject this statement. I will present to a special commission those cases in which General Wilecki did not carry out my orders."* In response to the question whether

¹⁶⁹ Jeffrey Simon, pp. 66-68.

*President Walesa asked the generals at Drawsko to vote for or against Kolodziejczyk, Wilecki said: "I do not think there was a vote." Kolodziejczyk countered: "The president ordered a vote [on the question should the defense minister be dismissed]. All hands except two went up."*¹⁷⁰

The recommendations of the commission called: a) for the disciplining of the officers involved in the incident; and b) for the reasserting of civilian control over military. Instead of following of the Seim's recommendations *"Walesa awarded bonuses to the three top generals who participated; Chief of Staff Wilecki, Deputy Chief of Staff Leon Komornicki, and Zdzislaw Ornatowski, commander of the Silesian MD "*.¹⁷¹

Walesa claimed that he lost confidence in Kolodziejczyk and the defense minister lost his position. The tension with Waldemar Pawlak's government led to a new crisis in late 1994, and resulted in the fall of the Cabinet in early 1995.¹⁷²

This conflict violated the democratic principles of civilian oversight. It harmed nonpartisan military and exposed a profound institutional weakness of Polish democracy. The deputy of Seim and former defense minister Komorowski noted: *"The Drawsko affair was very disquieting. It has not assumed the nature of a military coup, but this does not mean its seriousness should be underestimated "*.¹⁷³

One can suggest that there had been several political causes that ultimately led to the crisis in Polish civil-military relations:

¹⁷⁰ Jeffrey Simon, p. 68.

¹⁷¹ Jeffrey Simon, p. 72.

¹⁷² For more informations see "Political drama in Warsaw: uncivil relations", *ISSN Neivsbrief*, February 1995, vol. 15, No. 2.

¹⁷³ Jeffrey Simon, p. 69.

Firstly, the origin of the crisis of the civil-military relations arose from a failure to delegate authority between the President and government. The Sejm Defense Commission demonstrated a full inability to exercise an effective oversight of the armed forces. The activity of the defense ministry in providing an effective civilian control of the military was paralyzed by President Walesa mainly because of his tremendous political ambitions and irrepressible desire to secure monopoly of personal control over the armed forces.¹⁷⁴

Secondly, The Chief of Staff and general staff remained independent toward the ministry of defense. The military elite tried to exploit the situation. As Rudolf Joo observed: *"In order to maintain its bargaining position in successive periods of crisis. It was able gradually to enlarge its room for maneuver, and increased its leverage on political processes. The Defense Staff supported President Walesa's effort to personalize civilian control as Supreme Commander, leaving routine administrative tasks to the Ministry of Defense"*.¹⁷⁵ The Army became politicized. Chief of Staff General Wilecki made an attempt to establish complete autonomy vis-à-vis the government to build a "state within the state".¹⁷⁶

Thirdly, The lack of historical experience of civilian control over the armed forces and the difficult choices imposed upon the military by the imperative of reform, including

¹⁷⁴ Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the former defense minister of Poland, said: "It must be emphasized that, given the complexity of military issues in contemporary era, no single individual can effectively control the armed forces". For more information see Janusz Onyszkiewicz, "Poland's Road to Civilian Control" in *Civil-Military Relations and Democracy*, (ed. by Larry Diamond and Marc F. Plattner) The Jones Hopkins University Press, 1996, p. 106.

¹⁷⁵ Rudolf Joo, pp. 28-29.

¹⁷⁶ The First Deputy of the Minister of Defense of Poland Milewski expressed his own opinion toward this situation. He said: *"The military ought to be an instrument of policy. Military cannot be politician"*. Warsaw PAP, 8 March 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-045* (8 March 1995), p. 21.

reduction in the size of armed forces and the cutting of military budgets, reinforced the perception among the officer corps that the politicians did not care about the real problems of the army. This perception emerged because Walesa's view toward military *"arguing that 'military people should run the military,' Walesa supported draft legislation that would give greater power to the General Staff, reduce the role of the defense ministry, and subordinate military intelligence to the General Staff."*¹⁷⁷

The process provoked heated debate in Parliament about the effectiveness of ministerial political control, and led to speculation in the media about who is really in charge in the Ministry of Defense. Consequently, the absence of a constitutional provision contributed to the lack of effective civilian control of the armed forces, to government and constitutional crises and the cabinet's collapse.

D. THE WAY FORWARD

The current, *sixth reform stage*, started in November 1995 when Walesa lost the presidential election to the leader of the "Union of Democratic Left", Alexander Kwasniewski.¹⁷⁸ In reaction, the pro-Walesa Minister of Defense Okonski resigned and a candidate from the Polish Peasant Party took over. Closer cooperation between President Alexander Kwasniewski and Prime-minister Wlodzimiers Cimoszewicz opened the road toward democratic civilian control over the armed forces. The process began when in February 1996 Stanislaw Dobrzanski with full support of the President and Prime-minister

¹⁷⁷ Jeffrey Simon, p. 71.

¹⁷⁸ Warsaw PAP, 7 November 1995. *FBIS-EEU-95-216* (8 November 1995), p.45, and Jeffrey Simon, "NATO Enlargement and Central Europe: A Study in Civil-Military Relations", *NDU Press*, 1996, p. 100.

re-subordinated the WSI (intelligence and counterintelligence) and the General Staff Sixth Directorate (the military post) under his authority as a defense minister.¹⁷⁹ Dobrzanski also created the new military command structure with a new commander-the Chief of Land Forces. He was responsible for education, infrastructure and logistics. Previously, the General Staff was responsible for this service.¹⁸⁰

In July 1996 the Council of Ministers made an important step in the direction of civil-military reforms. It adopted a decree leading to the reorganization of defense ministry. According to the reform, the General Staff was just part of the defense ministry. It meant that the defense minister was in charge of all military affairs. It also assumed that the Chief of Staff commands the Army only on behalf of the defense minister.¹⁸¹

To eliminate the constitutional uncertainties in terms of civil-military relations and democratic control over the armed forces a new constitution was needed. This requirement hastened the constitution development process to replace the remnants of a communist era and to create a democratic constitution. The process started in Winter 1996 and finished in Summer 1997 when the new democratic constitution of Poland was successfully adopted and confirmed by referendum. *"The National Assembly of the Republic of Poland - made up of the two houses of Parliament, the Sejm and the Senate -*

¹⁷⁹ The Military Information Services and Academy of National Defense were subordinated directly to the Defense Minister according to the Law of Defense, which went to the effect on 14 February 1996. Warsaw *Polska Zbrojna*, 14 February 1996, p. 1. *FBIS-EEU-96-035* (21 February 1996), p. 57, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 104.

¹⁸⁰ Warsaw *Polityka*, 2 March 1996, pp. 3-7. *FBIS-EEU-96* (6 March 1996), pp.40-41, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 104.

¹⁸¹ Warsaw TV Polonia Network, 9 July 1996. *FBIS-EEU-96-133* (10 July 1996), p.51, and Jeffrey Simon, p. 109.

approved the final draft of the country's first post-Communist constitution April 2, and the majority of Poles voting in the May 25 Constitutional Referendum, endorsed the draft document. After the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the document, it was signed into law by President Aleksander Kwasniewski on July 16. " 182

According to the Constitution, the President gained a number of prerogatives such as *"the right to nominate the heads of the country's top judicial bodies-including the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Administrative Court and the chairman and vice-chairman of the Constitutional Tribunal - nominations until now made by the Sejm. He also gained the right to name the top military leaders, including the chief of the General Staff and the commanders in chief of the army, air force, and navy. These nominations require the countersignatures of the Prime Minister."* 183

The President is to be *"the supreme commander of the armed forces in peace time, and executes this function through the Minister of Defense. The armed forces are to remain neutral in political matters and are subject to civilian and democratic control. In time of war, the President, at the recommendation of the Prime Minister, names a Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces."* 184 According to the Polish constitution, the President has following prerogatives in terms of national security and defense matters:

Article 134

182 Polish Embassy Home Page. Internet Polska. Available HTTP:
<http://www.polishworld.com/polemb/const/key.html>

183 Ibid.

184 Ibid.

1. The President of the Republic shall be the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.
2. The President of the Republic, in times of peace, shall exercise command over the Armed Forces through the Minister of National Defense.
3. The President of the Republic shall appoint, for a specified period of time, the Chief of the General Staff and commanders of branches of the Armed Forces. The duration of their term of office, the procedure for and terms of their dismissal before the end thereof, shall be specified by statute.
4. The President of the Republic, for a period of war, shall appoint the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces on request of the Prime Minister. He may dismiss the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces in accordance with the same procedure. The authority of the Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, as well as the principle of his subordination to the constitutional organs of the Republic of Poland, shall be specified by statute.
5. The President of the Republic, on request of the Minister of National Defense, shall confer military ranks as specified by statute.
6. The authority of the President of the Republic, regarding his supreme command of the Armed Forces, shall be specified in detail by statute.¹⁸⁵

E. CONCLUSION

I. The process of transformation of civil-military relations in Poland proceeded under extremely difficult initial stages of reform and for a long period had been guided by a communist-style constitution that unsuitable to the new political

¹⁸⁵ Constitution Republic of Poland, International Constitutional Links. Available HTTP: <http://www.seim.gov.pl/eng/konst/konl.htm>

conditions. In spite of this fact, Poland made progress in democratic transformation and in establishing democratic civilian control over the armed forces:

Firstly, Poland depoliticized the army, by dismantling all Communist Party organs and eliminating the political officers.

Secondly, Poland provided the loyalty of the military to the new government.

Thirdly, Poland modified and then ended the ties between the military and Moscow. This required a strategic reorientation and the development of Poland's capability to determine its own defense policy and military doctrine directed to the West.

Fourthly, the democratically consolidated Polish parliament created the Sejm Commission for Defense which had the right to oversee the armed forces through the defense budget and to enter any military installation on demand.

Fifthly, the Polish President and Parliament did much to restore military prestige, public trust and accountability in society.¹⁸⁶

II. Unfortunately, the absence of constitutional and legal frameworks for a clear division of power led to constitutional and governmental crises, failure to delegate authority over the military between the president and government. These

¹⁸⁶ The Polish armed forces enjoy a very high degree of esteem of the population. *"In Poland they have retained the first place among all public institutions (with the approval rate between 72 and 80 percent and disapproval of 8 to 10 percent in 1992-1994). The armed forces thus outdistanced even the once most popular Polish institution-the Roman Catholic Church (whose approval rate was between 41 and 54 percent, and the disapproval rate between 36 and 54 percent during the same period). Other civilian institutions, including the president, cabinet and Parliament obtained much lower scores."* Anton A. Bebler, "Postscript" in Anton A. Bebler (ed.), *Civil-Military Relations in the Post-Communist States* (Central and Eastern Europe in Transition), (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1997), pp. 131-132.

circumstances led to violation of the principles of democratic civilian control over the armed forces and had the following negative results:

Firstly, During the constitutional crisis, the Sejm Defense Commission demonstrated weakness in effective oversight of the military.

Secondly, The activity of the defense ministry in providing an effective civilian control over the General Staff and the armed forces was paralyzed by President Walesa. This followed because of his political ambitions and his desire to impose a personal control over the military. As a result, the Chief of Staff and General Staff remained independent of the ministry of defense.

Thirdly, During the initial stages of democratic transformations neither Polish military nor the new political leadership had experience in working together. The lack of experience of civilian control over the armed forces and the difficult choices imposed upon the military by the imperative of reform, including reduction in the size of armed forces and the cutting of military budgets, reinforced the perception among the officer corps that politicians care little about the real problems of the army.

Fourthly, The process provoked heated debate in Parliament about the effectiveness of ministerial political control, and led to speculation in the media about who was really in charge in the Ministry of Defense. This development harmed and discredited the idea of civilian control of the military.

Finally, the absence of a constitutional provision contributed to the lack of effective civilian control of the armed forces, to government and constitutional crises and the cabinet's collapse.

III. Despite the difficulties of the initial stages of transition, Poland reached significant success in democratic transformation and in establishing a democratic system of civil-military relations. Once the adoption of a new Constitution provided a clear line of authority between the president and government, Poland made progress in personal relations among new Polish leaders. They have come to respect one another. Closer cooperation between President Alexander Kwasniewski and Prime-minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz opened the road toward democratic civilian control over the armed forces. Finally, after the several years of intensive debate, negotiations and political struggle a clear division of authority between president and government there emerged. The minister of defense also has enough authority to provide effective leadership of the military. Now the armed forces are subject to democratic control. In accordance with the new Polish Constitution, President Aleksander Kwasniewski clarified the chain of command within the Ministry of Defense and placed the Chief of the General Staff clearly under the authority of the civilian minister. The law also transferred oversight of military intelligence from the General Staff to the Ministry of Defense. The commission established to implement the law, eliminated the General Staff's parallel and autonomous structures, reformed the military justice system, and makes broad changes in the structure of the Ministry.

V. CONCLUSION

I. Healthy civil-military relations are an essential element of security for all of Europe. For this reason, since 1991 NATO has made the promotion of democratically controlled military a major part of its Cooperation Partnership agenda. The Alliance has embarked on a host of activities designed to foster democratically controlled military institutions, which will transform the relationship between NATO and Partner countries. The establishment of effective civil-military relations in the Partner states forms an important component of the overall political transition. A successful democratic transition will remove a potential crisis area on NATO's borders. This development is also a main prerequisite for integration of the Partner countries into Western defense.

II. Although civil-military relations of the post-communist states vary from country to country, there are some important political principles universal for all states. These should be taken into consideration as a core problem in the transition to democratic control over the armed forces.

*Firstly, "a country which has no problems of civil-military relations and democratic control is a country which has no democracy."*¹⁸⁷

The tensions between civilians and military will endure because armed forces constitute a conservative, hierarchical institution even within the democratic state. Thus,

¹⁸⁷ Chris Donnelly, "Defence Transformation in the New Democracies: A Framework for Tackling the Problem," *NATO Review*, No.1, January 1997, p. 17.

the main task of a democratically consolidated government is to learn *"how to cope with reconciling a non-democratic institution within a democracy."*¹⁸⁸

*Secondly, "every country will have a different solution to the problem which they will have to work out for themselves."*¹⁸⁹

Civil-military relations reflect such important elements of historical and political background of each country as:

- a) role of the armed forces in historical development of the country;
- b) democratic tradition of the society;
- c) type of political regime;
- d) interaction of the military and the society.

Thus, Western institutions can not solve this kind of problem. This is part of the domestic agenda for each country.

*Thirdly, "defense transformation, good civil-military relations and democratic control are problems which must be solved. They cannot be ignored or they will destabilize society."*¹⁹⁰

There are at least two aspects of the solution of these problems in terms of democratic control over the military:

¹⁸⁸ Chris Donnelly, p.17.

¹⁸⁹ Ibid, p. 17.

¹⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 18.

1. Democratic civil-military relations protect against external threats and can check tendencies to militarize governments for nationalist or even personal ambitions-something we saw in Poland during Walesa's rule.

2. The process of democratic transformation is not only one of the most important elements of democracy, but also an essential factor of defense capabilities. Consequently, *"it is in the interests of both the civilian government and the military authorities that it is successfully achieved."*¹⁹¹

*Fourthly, "democratic control is a two-way process between army and society, not one where politicians simply dictate to soldiers."*¹⁹²

Civilian government, as best it can, must provide the care, essential financing and respect of the armed forces *"in order that mutual trust, and a common interest in resolving the problem, can be developed. The essence of this symbiosis is accountability. The army is accountable to the government, the government is accountable to the army and to parliament, and parliament is accountable to the people."*¹⁹³

The success in developing mutual trust and accountability between government and armed forces depend on following factors:

- the necessity to establish a clear constitutional framework and the line of authority between president, government and parliament in the military matters;

¹⁹¹ Ibid, p.18.

¹⁹² Ibid, p.18.

¹⁹³ Ibid, p.18.

- keeping the armed forces out of party's political influences in order to avoid polarization of the military between political parties;
- need of having competent civilian specialists in defense issues ("civilianization" of ministries of defense), because *"If all advisers to defense policy-makers are military, and policy-makers are ignorant of military realities, then the army, not the government, is controlling defense policy."*¹⁹⁴

- necessity of the full integration of professional military into civilian society.
- Military in the post-communist countries still don't trust civilians because of the lack of historical experience of civilian control over the armed forces and the difficult choices imposed upon the military by the imperative of reform. These steps, including the reduction in the size of armed forces and the cutting of military budgets, reinforced the perception among the officer corps that the politicians don't care about the real problems of the army. It remains a serious problem and results in resistance of military to develop democratic civilian control.

III. To conclude, in order to transform from a communist to a democratic political system, all post-communist countries must establish a mechanism of **democratic civilian control** over the armed forces and institutionalize **democratic military professionalism**.

¹⁹⁴ Ibid, p.18.

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